MITIGATION OF FREE RIDING IN

PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS by unknown


Mohammed Onimisi Yahaya
2014
iii
Dedication
In memory of my late sister Aisha Jimoh bint Yahaya Osuwa
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
All praise is due to Allah, the lord and sustainer of the worlds, for his countless
favour and seeing me this far in life. I appreciate the support and prayers of my
parents, Alh. Yahaya Osuwa and Hajiya Sefinat Osuwa all through my life and
especially during this work. To my siblings, I say thank you all for being there
for me.
My profound gratitude goes to my advisor, Dr Farag Azzedin for his con-
structive criticism, guidance and especially the assistance he offered me during
the writing process. I thank all my committee members, Dr Moataz Ahmed,
Dr Ahsraf Mahmoud, Dr Nasir Darwish and Prof Shokri Selim for their support
and comments. Finally, I appreciate the advice and effort of Dr Slim Belheiza of
Mathematics Department towards the success of this work.
My special thanks go to my dear wife, Bilkisu Ohunene and our children,
Ammatullah Onize, Abdulmuhaimin Onoruoiza and Aisha Ahuoiza for their love,
care, understanding and patience throughout the entire PhD program.
To my friends and all the Nigerian and African Community in KFUPM, I wish
you all the best the life and hereafter has to offer. I specifically appreciate the
effort of my friends and brothers, Hamza Salami, Mohammed Adinoyi, Abdulrauf,
Zakaria Jamiu and Adeniran for their time and technical assistance.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF FIGURES xi
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) xiii
ABSTRACT (ARABIC) xv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Free Riding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Free Riding in Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.1 Types of Peer-to-Peer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Challenges of Peer-to-Peer Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.3 Free Riding in P2P Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.4 Effects of Free riding in P2P networks . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Motivation and Research Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
vi
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY 28
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Incentive Based Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Reciprocity Based Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Behavioral Based Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Game Theory Based Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CHAPTER 3 GAME THEORY 54
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 Game Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Game Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Game Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.2 Stag Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 Battle of Sexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.4 Matching Pennies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Game Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.1 Player-based Game Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.2 Action-based Game Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.3 Outcome-based Game Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5.4 Repetition-based Game Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.5 Termination-based Game Classification . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Game Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6.1 Dominant Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6.2 Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
CHAPTER 4 BITTORRENT SYSTEM 82
4.1 File Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 File Downloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.1 Metadata discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.2 Peer discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
vii
4.2.3 File dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Peer status update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Illustrative Example of File Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Piece Selection Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.6 Choking Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6.1 Regular Unchoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.6.2 Optimistic Unchoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CHAPTER 5 CHOKING ALGORITHM GAME MODELLING 105
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 Motivation for Using Game Theory in Modelling BitTorrent Chok-
ing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 The Game Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4.1 Game Model For Initial Seeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.2 Game Model For Leecher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.3 Game Model For Experienced Seeder . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.4 Game Model Every Thirty Seconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Model Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
CHAPTER 6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 127
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.3 The Simulation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3.1 PeerSim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3.2 BitPeer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.4 Simulating Free riding in BitTorrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.5 Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.6 BitTorrent Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.6.1 BitTorrent Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.6.2 Exploitation Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
viii
6.7 Game Model Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.7.1 Game Model Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.7.2 Game Model Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.7.3 Game Model Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 154
7.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2 Summary of Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3 Future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Bibliography 160
VITAE 185
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Characteristics of Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Free Riding in Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Payoff matrix for prisoner P1 and prisoner P1 . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Payoff matrix of Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Payoff matrix of stag hunt game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Payoff matrix of Battle of Sexes Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Payoff matrix of Matching Pennies Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Example of Players-related Classification of games . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Example of Actions-related Classification of games . . . . . . . . 77
3.8 Example of Moves-related Classification of games . . . . . . . . . 77
3.9 Example of Outcome-related Classification of games . . . . . . . 78
3.10 Payoff matrix of Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.11 Payoff matrix of Battle of Sexes Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1 BitTorrent messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Game Model: Initial Seeder to an opponent . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Game Model: Leecher to Leecher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Game Model: Leecher to Freerider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Game Model: Experienced Seeder to Leecher . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Game Model: Experienced Seeder to Free rider . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.6 Number of blocks uploaded by an IS to its neighbors . . . . . . . 118
6.1 Simulation design parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
x
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Examples of Distributed Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Types of incentives in P2P system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Direct and Indirect Reciprocity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Direct and Indirect Reputation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Extensive form representation of matching pennies game. . . . . . 58
3.2 Classification of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Player-based classifications of game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Player-identity effect classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Number of player classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Nature of player classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Information availability to player classifications of game. . . . . . 70
3.8 Action-based classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.9 Outcome-based classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.10 Repetition-based classifications of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.11 Termination-based classification of game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.1 Phases involved in uploading or downloading a file in BitTorrent. 83
4.2 File announcement steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 An Example Metadata. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Metadata discovery steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Message interleaving during file dissemination. . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 BitTorrent file sharing process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
xi
4.7 Choking algorithm time intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.8 Choking algorithm classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9 Snubbing algorithm time intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.10 Regular unchoking steps by Seeders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.11 Regular unchoking steps by Leechers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.12 Regular and Optimistic unchoking time intervals. . . . . . . . . . 104
4.13 Optimistic unchoking steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.1 A PeerSim sample configuration file. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2 Using 5% SEs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 136
6.3 Using 5% SEs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 137
6.4 Using 10% SEs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . 138
6.5 Using 10% SEs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . 138
6.6 Using 5% SEs: Download time for FRs and LEs. . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.7 Using 5% seeders and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by seeders. 140
6.8 Using 5% seeders and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs. . 141
6.9 Using 5% seeders and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by seeders. 141
6.10 Using 5% seeders and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs. . 142
6.11 Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 143
6.12 Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 144
6.13 Using 10% ISs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 144
6.14 Using 10% ISs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs. . . 145
6.15 Using 5% ISs: Download time for FRs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.16 Using 5% ISs: Download time for LEs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.17 Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ISs. . . . . 147
6.18 Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ESs. . . . 148
6.19 Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs. . . . 149
6.20 Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ISs. . . . . 149
6.21 Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ESs. . . . 150
6.22 Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs. . . . 150
xii
THESIS ABSTRACT
NAME: Mohammed Onimisi Yahaya
TITLE OF STUDY: Mitigation of Free Riding in Peer-to-Peer Systems
MAJOR FIELD: Computer Science and Engineering
DATE OF DEGREE: May 2014
Distributed systems are collection of autonomous computers, connected through
a network and distribution middleware, which enables computers to coordinate
their activities and to share the resources of the system, so that users perceive the
system as a single, integrated computing facility. A peer-to-peer system is a form
of distributed system in which all participating nodes have ”equal standing”, both
serving as either a client or server. The design principles of peer-to-peer systems
led to some challenges. One of these challenges is the problem of free riding. Free
riding has been identified as a threat to the existence of peer-to-peer systems, as
it negates the fundamental nature of peer-to-peers systems. Researchers are cur-
rently still designing techniques to curb free riding and therefore, there is a need
for robust solution to this complex problem. In this dissertation, we investigate
distributed systems in order to clearly classify them according to their character-
xiii
istics. We also examine each of the distributed systems and identify those that
are prone to free riding. Consequently, we proposed a taxonomy for distributed to
clearly identify them. In addition, we propose a new free riding based taxonomy
for distributed systems. Furthermore, we specifically focused on the problem of
free riding in peer-to-peer systems and investigate why it is very challenging. We
conducted a review of existing approaches to combating free riding in peer-to-peer
systems and identify research gaps between the existing approaches.
As a case study, we conducted an in depth study of BitTorrent system, one
of the most popular peer-to-peer file sharing system. In this phase of the thesis,
we investigated BitTorrent peer selection algorithms by carrying out experimental
analysis to understand BitTorrent exploitation points by free riders. Based on the
understanding gained from the analysis, we proposed a game theory-based choking
algorithm for BitTorrent to deter free riding. Finally, we carried out extensive
simulation to evaluate the performance of our proposed model and compared
our results with the existing BitTorrent. The results show that our proposed
game based choking algorithm out performed the existing choking algorithm in
BitTorrent.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems are experiencing a significant amount of attraction
due to the current technological advancements in communication, computation,
and storage [1, 2, 3]. The widespread and the success of P2P systems are due
to the nature and benefits of collaboration. To name few of these benefits, col-
laboration nurtures cross-boundary sagacious solutions, increases the overall work
done by the collection of shared resources, and creates an environment for mutual
gains [1, 2, 3]. This collaborative effort will not succeed if peers start to consume
resources more than they contribute. Non-collaborative peers, who do not con-
tribute to the community, are referred to as free riders in the literature [1, 4, 5, 6].
The phenomenon of free riding does not just create a tedious task that can be
bothersome for the contributors, but also can create a potential performance bot-
tleneck. As a consequence, responses to queries can experience a longer delay. In
a collaborative file sharing system, 66% of users do not share files (i.e., free riders)
and the top 25% users account for 99% of all downloads [7].
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 proposes a taxonomy of
distributed systems that we argue is essential to distinguish between P2P and
other distributed systems while section 1.2 examines the problem of free riding
in distributed systems in general. In section 1.4, we clearly define the problem
statement examined in this thesis as well as the motivation behind choosing such
a problem. Finally, section 1.7 outlines the organization of the thesis.
1.1 Distributed Systems
The need for wide-scale applications, consisting of large number of devices and
users, is emerging due to advances in computing and technology [8, 9, 10] such
as advances in mobile devices and big data analytics platforms. To support the
design and implementation of such applications, distributed systems are needed
since centralization is becoming unfeasible due to a number of unavoidable factors:
The client devices increases year over time and thus creating an increasingly
complex end systems
The data collected continues to grow exponentially with the use of advanced
technology
The analysis of such data is becoming imperative
The requirements of ongoing create a demand for agile and flexible systems
The cost of scaling is becoming too high to handle from both an adminis-
trative and infrastructure sides
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Single point of failure is unacceptable in an era where end users don’t tolerate
downtime
The inherent characteristics of reliability, availability, performance, scalabil-
ity, cost reduction, and non-centralized nature play a vital role in promoting
distributed systems [8, 9, 10]. As defined by Tanenbaum, a distributed system is
a collection of independent computers that appear to its users as a single coherent
system [8]. A distributed system can also be viewed as a collection of autonomous
computers, connected through a network and distribution middleware, which en-
ables these computers to coordinate their activities and to share the resources of
the system in such a way that users perceive the system as a single, integrated
computing facility [11]. Distributed systems have been classified based on in-
terconnection network, memory access, and Operating System [8][11]. As such,
distributed systems have been classified as: (a) tightly coupled where processors
share clock and memory, run a single operating system, and communicate fre-
quently and (b) loosely coupled, where each processor has its own memory, runs
its own operating system, and communicate infrequently.
Examples of distributed systems as shown in figure 1.1 include client-server
systems, cluster systems, Grid systems, P2P systems, Cloud systems and vol-
unteer systems. A cluster is a type of parallel or distributed processing system
consisting of a collection of interconnected stand-alone computers cooperatively
working together as a single integrated computing resource and are located in one
geographical location [12]. A Grid computing system is a dependable and coordi-
3
Figure 1.1: Examples of Distributed Systems.
nated collection of computing infrastructure that provide high end computational
capabilities [13][14]. P2P systems consist of interconnected nodes able to self or-
ganize with the purpose of sharing resources without requiring the intermediation
or support of a global centralized server or authority [15][16]. A volunteer system
is a voluntary-based initiative to harness a vast unused resources to achieve com-
putational intensive scientific projects such as SETI@home [17], Einstein@home
[18] and ABC@home [19]. A Cloud system is a paradigm that provides massive
computing infrastructure on pay as per use basis, accessible via the Internet [9].
The resources provided by a Cloud system are metered, hence, this technology is
based primarily on economy of scale, so that small organization could rent com-
puting facility and pay as per use other than investing in expensive computing
infrastructure.
With the emergence and the popularity of such loosely coupled distributed
systems (i.e., Grid systems, P2P systems, Cloud systems, volunteer systems),
there is a need for a classification to understand and shed light on the specific
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characteristics of such systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt for such a classification. Furthermore, our classification is applicable to
both tightly and loosely coupled distributed systems.
We provide a node-based taxonomy, where distributed systems are classified
according to Node Ownership, Node Controlling Policy, Node Management, and
Node Discovery Mechanism. Distributed system nodes are either all owned by a
global entity or each node is locally owned. Examples of distributed systems that
have local node ownership are client-server systems, Grid systems, P2P systems,
and volunteer computing systems. In a server-client environment, the server as
well as the clients are locally owned. Similarly, nodes in a Grid, a volunteer
computing or P2P environments are locally owned. In such environments, there
is no global entity that owns all nodes in the environment. On the other hand,
distributed systems such as cluster systems and Cloud systems, a global entity
owns all the participating nodes.
Node controlling policy refers to a set of rules controlling a node. These
policies are necessary for proper functionality of the system. The entity that
sets the controlling policy can be either a node itself or a system-wide global
entity. In distributed systems such as client-server, Grid and volunteer computing,
each node has a single controlling policy that is set locally. As such, each node
including the server has its own controlling policy. Systems such as P2P and
volunteer computing have no controlling policies while systems such as cluster
computing have global entity that sets the controlling policy for the whole system.
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In cloud computing, every node has local multiple controlling policies since a node
is virtually partitioned into virtual machines and each of these virtual machines
has its own controlling policy.
Node management is concerned with the entity that manages the node. A
node might manage itself. In this case, the node is managed locally. Examples of
distributed systems that are managed locally are client-server systems and P2P
systems. On the other hand, there might exist a global entity that manages the
node. In such a case, we say that the node is managed globally. In distributed
systems such as cluster systems, a global entity manages all the participating
nodes. In systems such as Grid, Cloud and volunteer systems, there exists a
global entity managing the local nodes but this global management is done under
the local policies.
In a distributed system, the process by which a node becomes aware of other
nodes is referred to node discovery. The node discovery mechanism to find a
participating node in the network may be centralized, distributed or none. In
systems such as client-server, cluster and volunteer computing, there is no discover
mechanism. Nodes in these systems do not need to discover others. The rest of
the distributed system might have a centralized or distributed mechanism for node
discovery. As a summary, Table 1.1 classifies the distributed systems according
to our taxonomy.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Distributed Systems
Distributed
Environ-
ments
Node
Owner-
ship
Node Control-
ling Policy
Node Manage-
ment
Node Dis-
covery
Mecha-
nisms
Client-Server
Systems
local local single con-
trolling policy
local none
Cluster Sys-
tems
global(single
ownership)
global single con-
trolling policy
global none
Grid Systems local local single con-
trolling policy
global manage-
ment under local
policies
centralized
or dis-
tributed
Peer-to-Peer
Systems
local none local centralized
or dis-
tributed
Cloud Systems local local multiple
controlling poli-
cies
global manage-
ments under local
policies
centralized
or dis-
tributed
Volunteer
Computing
Systems
local local single con-
trolling policy
global manage-
ment under local
policies
none
1.2 Free Riding
The burden of giving should not be on the shoulders of specific users. These
altruistic users might be very few and this will create bottlenecks resulting in
degrading the quality-of-service (QoS). As such, if users do not contribute, appli-
cations such as distributing multimedia content over the Internet may not survive.
Also, burdening the collaborative users with huge requests might force them to
be non-collaborative. Furthermore, non-collaborative users negate the advantages
of distribution and hence convert a distributed architecture to few scattered cen-
tralized nodes. Free riding is consuming more resources than one’s contribution
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
Free riders are peers with selfish behavior with the intent of taking advantages
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of other peers in the network. Free riding peers devise means of utilizing the
resources of other peers in the network, so as to contribute less or nothing to
other peers. Free riders can also share malicious content so as to deceive the
environment that they are contributing. Also, free riders can deliberately upload
useless files that do not benefit others, in order to hide under that cover for the
purpose of downloading files [26].
The free riding problem is not unique to distributed environments alone.
The problem of free riding emerged from Economics with regards to public
goods. These are goods that are both ”non-excludable” and ”non-rival”. A
non-excludable resource means that an individual user cannot effectively exclude
others from using it. Non-rival resources are type of resources that their use by
an individual does not reduce the availability to others. Some examples of such
goods are fresh air, knowledge and street lighting. However, if there is ability to
impose restrictions on these goods they become private goods. Economists have
studied the free riding problem [27, 28] and the tragedy of the common [29], a
situation where some selfish individuals refrain from contributing to the common
good. Some familiar examples in our society are, overuse of public resources such
as over fishing in the deep ocean, pollution of the environment and excessive use
of pesticides.
Similarly, shared computer resources in distributed systems have been com-
pared to public and private goods in Economics. In [6], the authors pointed out
that the fundamental difference in the characteristics of public goods in Economics
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from that of information goods in distributed systems is that, while that the for-
mer is non-rival, the latter is affected by the fact that the provider of the content
also participate in the sharing and usage of the same resource. Thus, any deficit
from both producer and consumer will definitely affect the quality and quantity
of the goods as well as overall performance of the system. For instance, sharing
in P2P systems is an act similar to the private provision of public goods [30].
1.2.1 Free Riding in Distributed Systems
The problem of free riding in distributed systems has not been largely explored.
Most of the earlier work in literature on free riding focuses on P2P system alone.
In this section, we investigate further free riding in all distributed systems, so as
to find out in addition to P2P networks, which other distributed environment is
prone to free riding and what are the characteristics that give rise to the problem
if any.
Generally, free riding is consuming resources more than providing resources. In
the quest to fully understand free riding in distributed systems, there is a need for
a critical analysis of this definition. This definition highlights resource provision
as the key element. Each distributed system is made up of service providers and
service consumers. They use resources to provide and consume services. These
services include computational services, storage services, file sharing services, tele-
phony services and video streaming services. To be able to provide these services,
some or all of computer resources such as files, CPU time, storage devices, mem-
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ory locations and network bandwidth are utilized. For instance, in a file sharing
service, the primary resource needed to provide this service is files.
In view of these, we assert that, if the resources shared to provide the service
by any of the distributed systems have public-subscription, then the system is
prone to free riding. Otherwise, if resource provision is closed, free riding is not
possible. Based on this assertion, we examine and classify distributed systems
based on service and resource provision. The summary of this comparison is
presented in Table 1.2. We now classify each of the distributed systems with
respect to their services and resources provision to determine the possibility of
existence of free riding.
Client-Server System: In a client-server system, the resources utilized
to provide the service may be public or private. Free riding may occur in
this system depending on the scenario of resource provision. We explain in
detail each of these cases.
– Case 1: Consider a client-server system where clients provide the re-
sources and the server provides the service. As such, the resource
provision is public, hence free riding is always possible in this system.
– Case 2: Consider a client-server system where the server provides the
resources and the services. In this scenario, the existence of free riders
is impossible. This is due to the fact that the resource provision is
private.
– Case 3: Consider a client-server system where the clients and the
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server provide the resources while the server provides the service. In
this scenario, free riding exist as the provision of resources is both
private and public.
Peer-to-Peer System: There are two cases in P2P systems.
– Case 1: Public P2P system : In this type of network, both the
service and the resources are being provided by any peer in the system.
In this case, free riding is always possible.
– Case 2: Closed P2P System:. Peers in this system provide both
service and resources but the system does not have public-subscription.
An example of such system is Skype [31]. Therefore, such a system is
free from free riding.
Grid System: Grid is a coordinated hardware and software infrastructure
that provides dependable, consistent high end computational power [13]. By
this definition, service and resource provision is coordinated and dependable,
hence free riding is not possible.
Cluster Systems: In this system, both resources and services are private
and under direct control of system owners. Users that subscribe to these
system use and adhere to control and management policy set by the owners,
hence free riding does not exist in cluster systems.
Cloud Systems: Here, both resources and services are metered by the
provider which is private and under direct control of system provider. Users
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Table 1.2: Free Riding in Distributed Systems
Distributed Envi-
ronments
Resource and Service Provision Comments
Client-Server Systems
Clients provide resources and server provides
service
Free riding always
exists.
Server provides resources and services. No free riding
Clients and server provide resources while server
provides service.
Free riding some-
time exists
Cluster Systems Resources and services provided by one entity
(owner)
No free riding
Grid Systems Resources and services coordinated and moni-
tored
No free riding
Peer-to-Peer Systems
Both resources and services provided by any
peer
Free riding always
exists
Resources and services may be provided by mon-
itored peers
No free riding
Volunteer Computing
Systems
Free will contributions Free riding not a
concern
Cloud Systems Resources and services provided by one entity
(owner)
No free riding
that subscribe to this system use and adhere to control and management
policy set by the owners, hence free riding does not exist in both systems.
Volunteer Computing System: The resources in this system are pro-
vided by the public, but the service and the system is managed by a global
entity. Free riding is not a concern in this form of distributed system, since
the whole system is based on voluntary contributions from individuals. In
this case, resources provided by a donor node is not expected to be depend-
able and continuous in supply. The system is being coordinated using public
resources.
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1.3 Peer-to-Peer Systems
Having identified P2P systems as one of the distributed systems with problem of
free riding, we concentrate specifically on the features of P2P systems. We discuss
the general challenges of sharing in P2P system and focus on the free riding
problem and it effects in P2P systems. P2P systems have received significant
attention in recent years, due to the advancement in the world of information
technology. P2P systems have inspired the design of social networking sites that
made large scale interaction of people and businesses possible. The availability of
new forms of P2P paradigm such as B2C (Business to Consumer), B2B (Business
to Business), B2E (Business to Employee) and B2G (Business to Government)
has made simultaneous exchange of resources among numerous users through the
traditional client-server model almost impossible. The severe limitations of the
client-server model in terms of memory, bandwidth, storage and CPU, led to
the current rise in the utilization of P2P systems for storage sharing, processing
power sharing and large scale content distribution such as video streaming, file
sharing and music sharing. This increase in the use of P2P systems also comes
with its challenges, which has made it an area of current research. Most of the
earlier research efforts on P2P systems concentrated on the design of efficient
search mechanisms, improving resource indexing methodology, performance and
scalability issues. The intent of P2P systems for large scale content distribution,
communication, distributed computation and collaboration is being threatened by
the problem of free riding.
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A P2P system is described as a system that relies on computing power and
bandwidth of nodes at the ends of a connection rather than concentrating on
low number of servers within the network [32]. In [33], the authors defined P2P
systems as any network that exhibits the following characteristics: distributed
control, self organized and symmetric communication. There are many types of
P2P systems, mostly used for large scale content distribution, file sharing, plat-
form sharing, communication, distributed computation and collaboration. The
concept of P2P systems is different from that of client-server model in the de-
sign principles. Researchers in [34] identified the principles of P2P as principle
of sharing, decentralization and self organization. In addition, the authors in [35]
identified anonymity, autonomy and open nature as principles of P2P systems.
In order to provide a better understanding of P2P paradigm, we list the design
principles of P2P systems as follows :
Equal standing : This is a fundamental design principle of any P2P
system. It requires that every peer in the networks acts as a servent, that
is either as a client or server. This principle, exemplify the P2P paradigm
as an alternative to the traditional client/server model which uses servers
for service provision, monitoring and access. P2P systems eliminate the
need for central servers which are known to constitute a bottleneck to the
expansion of the networks as well as creating a single point of failure. Peers’
equal standing gives rise to some peculiar characteristics exhibited by these
systems due to lack of central control. For instance, high degree of entry
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and exit, high degree of autonomy from central server.
Autonomy: Autonomy of an entity refers to the impossibility of external
control in an interaction [36]. This freewill to do anything without exter-
nal influence includes mobility-the will to join and leave the networks at
any time. Resource sharing is based on voluntary collaboration, therefore,
peers have the freedom to share or not to share, to be selfish or generous.
The leeway for peers to change identity, the decision to be trustworthy or
untrustworthy, honest or liar; all these actions are under the control of an
autonomous peer.
Anonymity : This refers to the desire of a peer in a network to be publicly
unknown. In most P2P systems pseudonyms are used for access rather than
full authentication. In reality, pseudo-anonymity is achieved with the use of
pseudonyms as in the case of ID, bank account number, nickname etc.
Self organizing : P2P systems require that the architecture should adjust
and organize itself if a new peer joins or leaves the networks. The rapid
growth in P2P is due to it resiliency in absorbing expansion and shrinking
due to it self organizing nature. A self organizing network should automat-
ically adapt to entry, exit and failure of nodes [37]
Some level of decentralization: This design principle excludes the need
for architectures that requires central management. P2P systems eliminate
completely or partially the need for central server. The level of decentraliza-
15
tion depends on the design objective, application and performance require-
ments. But zero-level decentralization as in client-server model negates the
principle of P2P systems.
1.3.1 Types of Peer-to-Peer Systems
In general, there are several classifications of Peer-to-Peer networks [15, 1] such
as classification based on structure of the network, degree of centralization, level
of access and type of service provided. Structural classifications of the network
depends on how the nodes on the over lay networks are connected together. In
the following subsection, we present the structured based classification.
Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems
In unstructured P2P networks, there is no structure in the overlay network, no
specific criteria and algorithm in the arrangement of the nodes. P2P overlay
networks comprises of a participating nodes in the networks. There exist a link
between any nodes that knows each other. It is a logical networks that are based
on ad hoc connections. The overlay networks in unstructured P2P are formed
arbitrarily in a flat or hierarchical manner. There is no single point of failure and
requires no administrative efforts. For instance a link exist between any two nodes
that has a TCP connection. In order to retrieve as many contents as possible,
searching in this model is done through different methods such as flooding, random
walking [38] and expanding ring(e.g Time to Live in Gnutella) [39]. There are three
types of unstructured P2P networks, depending on the degree of centralization.
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1. Pure Unstructured P2P: In this model, all peers acts as client and servers
with no central authority. Communication and exchange of resources be-
tween peers are random since there is no central coordination. Search re-
quests from peers are passed to neighbors, if direct neighbor does not have
the resource it passed it on until a request hit based on a predefined search
depth. For instance, Time-to-Live in Gnutella. When there is a search match
for the requested resource, the requesting peer download directly from the
peer that has the resource for offer. The overlay network in this model is
flat with a single routing layer. There is no central look up server, hence,
no single point of failure. However, this system does not scale up to higher
population as communication may grow with respect to the number of peers.
A typical example of this type of P2P system is Gnutella and it relatives
such as iMesh, Freenet and AudioGalaxy.
2. Hybrid Unstructured P2P: In this architecture, there are no central
servers but there exist clusters of nodes around some peers called super
peers. Also known as ultra peers or overlay nodes in some literature. These
infrastructure nodes called super nodes create hierarchy in the overlay net-
work as against the flat manner in pure unstructured. The role of a node
in this model may vary with time. An ordinary node this time may be a
super node after sometimes. Some examples of this model is BitTorrent and
Kazaa built upon FasTrack [40].
3. Centralized Unstructured P2P: In this model, a centralized directory
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that maintains information about peers exist. To access any resources, peers’
request is channeled through this central authority. The connections be-
tween peers are not determined by the central authority, it is only used for
indexing and bootstrapping. For example, in a centralized P2P file sharing
networks, when a peer joins the networks, it contact the central server for
it request to download file. The server performs the lookup search for the
stored files and their holders, it then responds to the requesting peer with
the list of all the stored files, the peers and their addresses. The peer then
send query to the node that posses his file of interest to download the file.
A typical example of this model is Napster.
Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems
Structured P2P model is organized following specific criteria, algorithms and
topology. Structure P2P system tightly associates placement of files with
the structure of the overlay networks. The most common amongst them use
distributed hash tables (DHT). DHT provides a look up service with (key,
value) stored with unique identifier. This hash table type look up search
guarantee locating a specific files if only it is available in the network. They
are also referred to as overlay networks. The system may differ in look
up service, organization and routing strategy. For instance, the organiza-
tion may be in form of ring, hypercube, butterfly etc. Furthermore, in this
architecture, resources indices are systematically distributed amongst par-
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ticipating nodes, so that queries for that resources such as files are directly
routed to the peer holding the file. A new entrant into this type of network
is assigned a peer set with directory of files keys and peers addresses. Ex-
amples of such systems that are based on DHT are Chord [41]and P-Grid
[42].
1.3.2 Challenges of Peer-to-Peer Sharing
In spite of these design principles that contributed to the success of P2P
systems, there are challenges [43, 44] posed by P2P systems:
Free Riding: This is a phenomena, where a peer contribute less than
what it consume. This is the main topic of this thesis, we will expatiate
on this in next section of this dissertation.
Identity Management: Persistent identity is not a stringent require-
ment for participating in P2P sharing, due to design goals of the net-
works. Thus, the availability of cheap or free pseudonyms would make
a selfish or malicious peer, to exit when it is about to be discovered
and rejoin with a different name, thereby evading any mechanism put
in place to check such misbehavior.
Trust Management: The management of trust and reputations of
peers is another major challenge facing sharing in P2P systems. The
notion of resource availability, authenticity, access control and fair trad-
ing [45] is threatened by various trust and reputation issues such as col-
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lusion among nodes. An untrustworthy peer may pollute other peers’
contents, that is adding impostor contents just to pollute the popularity
of files shared by others.
Security Management: Security challenges are common to all com-
puting system. In P2P system, the design characteristics of high rate
of mobility, autonomy and anonymity pose a lot of security challenges.
These include transmission of malicious contents such as virus, worms
and trojan by malicious peer to deliberately harm others in the net-
works. Furthermore, there is high level of vulnerability of P2P softwares
and risk attached to downloaded content.
1.3.3 Free Riding in P2P Systems
Researchers in [23, 24, 20] have identified the existence of free riding in P2P
systems. The statistics in [23] show that 25% of the peers in the network
provides about 99% of the resources in Gnutella. In [46], researchers found
the existence of free riding in Gnutella 0.6. The authors in [20] corroborated
the result of [23] by confirming that 7% of the peers contributed more files
than others in file sharing networks. In [24], the authors reported the ef-
fects of free riding on the performance of the networks. This results exposed
the level and seriousness of the problem, as they found that free riding has
increased to 85% in Gnutella. There are other measurement studies to con-
firm the existence and seriousness of free riding such as [47, 48, 49]. In [47],
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the authors performed a measurement study on the traffic of PPlive [50],
SOPcast [51] and PPstream [52]. They reported the imbalance between
peers’ file streaming consumption and contribution level. The existence of
low fairness ratio in Joost [53] is reported in [48]. In [49], the researchers
presented the result of log analysis from Roxbeam Media Networks [54] and
confirmed that some peers consume more than their contributions. There is
a need for more research effort to develop robust algorithms and techniques
to identify free riders and reduce their effects to the barest minimum or
possibly eliminate them.
Free riders exploit design principles of P2P systems as explained in sec-
tion 1.3 to carry out their intent. The activities of free riders constitute a
serious threat to the existence of P2P systems as it affect performance and
peer utilization of resources [23, 55]. Free riders do not play by the rules
of the game of P2P systems, which is supposed to be a cooperative game.
These non-cooperative players subvert the overall objectives of the networks,
to satisfy their selfish needs.
1.3.4 Effects of Free riding in P2P networks
Although, most of the popular P2P systems such as BitTorent, Gnutella,
Napster, and KaZaa have mechanisms for discouraging free riders, the prob-
lem of free riding still poses a serious threat to the existence and survival
of P2P systems. The impact differs from one network to the other. The
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effects of free riding range from simply annoying the networks or so severe
that could bring down the whole system, depending on the networks [1].
For instance, In [4], the authors posited that free riding affects robustness,
expandability and availability of P2P networks. They asserted that a net-
work without a free rider counteracting mechanism will have a short life
time. This assertion is supported in [56], as the authors argued that if the
degree of free riding exceeds the benefits of contribution, the system can be
brought to a standstill.
Furthermore, it is reported in [2, 57] that if the menace of free riding is not
checked, P2P networks will be reduced to Client-Server paradigm. As the
number of free riders increases, the network performance is degraded by the
increase in traffic generated by free riders to the networks. The few altruistic
peers will become ’server’ to the free riders constituting a bottleneck to the
networks.
However, in [6], the authors argued that though without external incentives,
the level of contribution might be below the socially desirable optimum, file
sharing P2P networks can tolerate some degree of free riding due to altruism
of some peers.
In summary, the effect of free riding in P2P systems can not be over empha-
sized as evident in the following recent research work in the literature, sum-
marized as follows; performance degradation [58], increases system stress,
degradation of user experience and denial of service [25, 59, 60], degrades
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scalability [61, 62], and destroys the philosophy of P2P file sharing net-
work [63].
1.4 Motivation and Research Problem
Mitigation of free riding in P2P systems is currently an important area of
research [64, 62, 25, 58, 65]. This is also confirmed through recent work in
literature that described the effects of free riding in P2P systems such as
[58, 25, 59, 64, 61]. The recent work of [65, 61] and the earlier work in [66]
also focused on solving this crucial and vital problem to the success of P2P
resource sharing communities. Recently the problem of unfairness due to
free riding in BitTorrent is also reported in [39].
Free riders negate the advantages of P2P systems. Free riders encourage self-
ish behavior and create bottlenecks. With selfish behavior, resource sharing
P2P systems will not survive since resources will be limited and a conse-
quence, scalability is negated as well by having only few resource providers.
Since BitTorrent is one of the most popular file sharing protocols implement-
ing P2P resource sharing [67, 68, 39, 62, 69] and it has enabled a powerful
community of large content distributions [70, 71, 65], researchers have iden-
tified free riding in BitTorrent and proposed solutions to solve the problem
of free riding [39, 67, 68, 72]. In this thesis, we study and analyze the BitTor-
rent choking algorithm, show the exploitation of BitTorrent by free riders,
pinpoint the root causes of this exploitation, and propose a solution based
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on game theory to mitigate free riding in BitTorrent.
In an attempt to proffer a solution to the problem of free riding in P2P
systems, we ask and attempt to answer the following questions.
Does free riding occur in all distributed systems?
What are the characteristics of these distributed systems prone to free
riding?
Why is mitigation of free riding in P2P system a challenging task?
How do we model and identify a free rider in P2P systems?
How can we effectively mitigate free riding in P2P systems?
1.5 Objectives
The goal of this dissertation, is to design a robust mechanism for effective
identification and control of free riders in a P2P system. Our specific objec-
tives are:
(a) To investigate distributed systems so as to understand their distin-
guishing characteristics.
(b) To investigate all distributed systems so as to identify those that are
prone to free riding.
(c) To investigate and identify the strength and weaknesses of existing free
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rider detection techniques, so as to evolve new strategies for improve-
ment.
(d) To characterize and model interactions with Game Theory amongst
different types of peers in a P2P system.
(e) To formulate robust free riding mitigation mechanism in P2P systems
by building a game theoretic based model.
(f) To design and simulate the proposed mechanism and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed solution in mitigating the effect of free riders
in P2P systems.
1.6 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
(a) An extensive literature survey on existing free riders mitigation ap-
proaches.
(b) Propose a node-based taxonomy of distributed systems. This will pro-
vides a deeper understanding of the distinguishing characteristics of
different types of distributed systems. This taxonomy will also assist
in identifying distributed systems that are prone to free riding.
(c) Propose a game-based taxonomy of games from the game theory per-
spective
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(d) Propose and evaluate a novel free riding mitigation mechanism for Bit-
Torrent systems based on Game theoretic modelling.
(e) An extensive simulation-based evaluation study to investigate the per-
formance of our proposed model using BitTorrent as a case study.
1.7 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, we start by providing a node-based taxonomy for dis-
tributed systems and identify which of these distributed systems is
prone to free riding. Based on our proposed taxonomy, we identified
client-server systems as well as P2P systems as distributed systems
prone to free riding. We choose P2P system as our focus of research
since P2P protocols are among the successful and popular protocols in
usage [67, 68, 39, 62, 69].
Among the P2P protocols, we devoted our research towards BitTorrent
since it is one of the most successful P2P protocols today [67, 68, 39].
We thoroughly studied the BitTorrent choking algorithm and identified
its vulnerabilities to free riders. Then, we proposed a game-theory-
based model to mitigate free riding in BitTorrent. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt in mitigating free riding in BitTor-
rent using game theory. We conducted extensive performance evalua-
tion experiments to assess our proposed model in mitigating free riders
in BitTorrent.
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the
related literature and gives background information on the different
approaches to solve free riding. Chapter 3 presents an overview of
game theory and introduces the general concepts of playing a game.
This Chapter also proposes a taxonomy for games while Chapter 4
presents and analyzes the BitTorrent system particularly the choking
algorithm and its advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 5 models the
BitTorrent choking algorithm using game theory and also shows the
model implementation. Performance studies are performed in Chapter
6 to investigate the effectiveness of the utility of our proposed game-
theory-model. The thesis closes with future work and conclusions in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Overview
Free riders’ problem in P2P networks has been addressed by many re-
searchers in the literature. Some researchers designed algorithms to
encourage cooperation amongst peers, while others tailored such al-
gorithms toward detection and punishment. The objective of all these
algorithms is to counteract free riders’ activities and hence reduce their
effects in P2P systems. In this chapter, we classify the existing algo-
rithms as incentive based, reciprocity based, behavioral based, and
game theory based. The following sections present a comprehensive re-
view of mitigating free riding algorithms in P2P systems. In section 2.2,
we present incentive based schemes. Section 2.3 reviews the reciprocity
based schemes. Behavioral based schemes are surveyed in section 2.4
while, game theory based schemes are reviewed in section 2.5.
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2.2 Incentive Based Schemes
Incentives have been identified to encourage cooperation amongst par-
ticipating peers in P2P networks. The incentives could be monetary
or other types of non priced incentives that designers deem fit such as
service, delay, network membership, and peer rating [73]. Incentive
approaches differ in the type of incentive used and the method of man-
aging the incentives as shown in Figure 2.1. For instance, in monetary
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Figure 2.1: Types of incentives in P2P system.
incentive schemes, users are expected to pay for the services received
and be paid for services provided in the P2P community. This approach
involves the use of virtual currency or digital coins such as XPay [74],
KARMA [75], Mojonation [76] and tycoon [10]. The basic idea is that,
attaching an economic value to resources in a social community will
serve as incentives to encourage peers to contribute more of their re-
sources and get rewarded. It will also serve as punishment for peers that
refuse to contribute resources. Pricing is considered to be an effective
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means of enhancing peer cooperation in P2P network [77, 78]. Stock
market auction based pricing approach is proposed in [79, 3]. While the
authors in [80] proposed a lottery based pricing approach. Most mon-
etary incentive based techniques are similar. Some of the fundamental
differences are the pricing methods and the exchange mechanisms for
the virtual currency between peers in a transaction. In [55], the authors
suggested flat rate prices for every peer, but this did not effectively dis-
courage free riding due to the availability of cheap pseudonyms and the
difficulty in tracking peers’ identity.
In [75], the authors proposed a scalar unit currency called KARMA
exchanged between peers while exchanging files. This is a differ-
ent from [55], in that, a peer does not store the KARMA. The ex-
change is made by bank-set which is a group of peers that stores the
KARMA. The drawback of this technique is that it requires a central
administration-entity to manage the KARMA usage.
In Ppay [81], digital coins are exchanged between peers while exchang-
ing resources. These coins are managed by a central authority called
a broker. When a peer joins the network, the peer opens an account
with the broker and gets an initial credit. Each coin is identified by a
coin identifier as well as an identifier of the current coin holder. While
exchanging resources, a peer holding a coin transfers the coin to an-
other peer that shared the resource. This transfer is done through the
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broker.
The researchers in [82] proposed a micropayment scheme called flood-
gate. The authors modified BitTorrent and introduced a content
provider which controls the tracker. Each peer joining the BitTor-
rent environment must register and open an account with the content
provider. When a peer wants to download a file, it searches the repos-
itory operated by the content provider. The content provider contacts
the tracker to locate the required file pieces. The token collected from
the downloader is given to the provider of that file pieces which can be
redeemed at the content provider for future download.
In [7], the authors proposed an incentive mechanism to deter free rid-
ing. Credits are computed and assigned to every peer based on their
contributions to the network. Credits are managed by a central author-
ity where peers are only allowed to ”trade” if they have enough credits.
As such, upload of resources increases the credits while download de-
creases those credits. A free riding peer depletes its credits quickly if
it doesn’t upload resources.
In [4], the authors presented distributed, monitoring-based, hierarchical
structure(DHMS) model. It uses an utility function made up of size of
the file, the number of files and the reputation of a peer. This model
was implemented in DHMS topology with two classes of peers, super
peers and ordinary peers. Their results demonstrate the need for a
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robust mechanism to combat free riding. They concluded that without
an effective mechanism to mitigate the activities of free riders, P2P
network would have a short life span.
In [83], a content management protocol to deter free riders and en-
courage contribution is proposed. In this approach, a peer monitors
the traffic of its neighbors routed through it. In this case, the number
of query messages from a peer is compared to query messages from it
neighbors. A peer can either be a monitor or be monitored. It counts
the query hits of that of it neighbors. If a peer is discovered to be free
riding, set of actions such as decrementing the TTL value, ignoring
that peers request or even disconnection from the networks depending
on the level of free riding is applied on that peer.
In general, incentive based approaches require infrastructure for ac-
counting and micropayment. Thus, there is a need for central authority
for administration and control. The cost of exchanging the account-
ing information is also a serious challenge facing the implementation
of these schemes [84, 81]. Moreover, the problems of payment deliv-
ery, churn rate variation, cost manipulation and persistent identity are
challenging issues that need to be resolved [5].
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2.3 Reciprocity Based Schemes
Reciprocity or barter systems involve exchange of services between
peers based on their contribution level to each other. The ability of
peers to predict future need from other peer is central to this ap-
proach. Tit-for-tat [85, 86] in BitTorrent is an example of barter-based
approach. As shown in Figure 2.2, there are two types of reciprocity;
direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is based
on repetition of transaction between peers. While indirect reciprocity
is based on reputation through recommendations of other peers that
have interacted with a particular peer of interest.
Figure 2.2: Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.
Tit-for-tat has been introduced in BitTorrent environment by the au-
thors in [86]. In such an environment, files are divided into pieces.
Tit-for-tat ensures exchange of pieces since peers have to provide in
order to receive from other peers. A peer can temporary refuse to up-
load limits how fast a peer can downloads if it is unwilling to upload
files for others. Pure tit-for-tat have been flawed for its inability to
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ensure fair exchange of files, especially for new comers in a dynamic
system environment like P2P. Other mechanisms are proposed to be
used in conjunction with tit-for-tat in BitTorrent to increase it perfor-
mance. For instance, source coding approach is proposed in [87]. In
this scheme, each data block is considered to be a sequence of alpha-
bets. This techniques helps in discouraging malicious peer from taking
advantage of pure tit-for-tat. Others forms of tit-for-tat are discussed
in [88, 89] where a peer is randomly selected so as to allow new comers
into the networks. This gives them a chance to download without the
need for reciprocation. In the long run they would have to contribute
resources to others the network, by the time they have files to share.
Odd-for-even approach proposed in [90] is a slight modification of tit-
for-tat. In this scheme, files are divided into two pieces of odd and
even. Peers are expected to negotiate the exchange of pieces, so as to
download the pieces that they are not in possession of. If a peer sends
it odd piece and does not receives the even piece from it partner, hence
that peer is choked for free riding.
In [91], the authors proposed treat-before-trick for BitTorrent-like P2P
networks. A peer providing a file in this scheme encrypts the file’s pieces
with keys and the decrypting keys of each chunk are shared among
the peers. Peers are forced to exchange the keys with one another to
download their missing chunks, hence making free riders downloaded
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files unreadable.
The authors in [92] proposed a quota-based block encryption approach
for BitTorrent. In this mechanism, peers are required to exchange en-
crypted blocks with a randomly generated encryption keys. It uses
symmetric-key cryptography in which the encryption and decryption
keys are the same. Each peer in a trading session, evaluate two func-
tions to determine whether to send encrypted blocks or decryption keys.
These functions are several variables dependent between two leechers
i, j. The variables are number of encrypted blocks received and sent,
number of decryption key sent and received, as well as their differ-
ences. The outcome of the contributiveness function determines if the
leecher is to send encrypted block while the optimism function deter-
mines if a leecher is to send decryption keys. The authors modelled
both contributiveness and optimism function for each peer type de-
scribed. The proposed peer types in the model are obedient,free rider,
conservative strategic and aggressive peers. They compared the quota-
based approach with BitTorrent choking algorithm and concluded that
quota-based can effectively replace choking algorithm.
The main drawbacks of these approaches are, namely, scalability, peer
identity management, fake service and record keeping [5, 84]. Scalabil-
ity, it does not scale to larger population of peers. As such, there is no
guarantee of repetitive transactions as the number of peers in the net-
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work increases. The peer identity management, for effective tracking
of peers, there is a need for persistent identity. But, the availability
of cheap pseudonyms would make tracking peers identity a herculean
task. Peers might also elicit services from other peers with the use of
fake services. Keeping an accurate record of peers contribution level
could undermine this approach.
2.4 Behavioral Based Schemes
In this scheme, peers behavior based on direct interaction such as trust
and perception of others are used to design mechanisms to curb free
riding. Trust is defined as the confidence that a peer has to ensure that
it will be treated fairly and securely, when interacting with another
peer [93]. The reputation of a peer is a perception of its behavior
based on other peers’ observations or the collective information about
the peer’s past behavior within a specific context at a given time [94].
In other word, reputation is the opinion of peers toward a peer or a
group of peers based on intention and social norm [95]. Reputation is
contextual in nature but is an integral part of many facets of life such
as business, online communities and social networks. Reputation could
be derived, inferred or based on direct interactions.
Reputation and trust of peers have been used to enhance cooperation
in a P2P systems by detecting and punishing unwanted behavior as
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Figure 2.3: Direct and Indirect Reputation.
well as appraising and rewarding wanted behavior. These have also
been employed in tracking free riders, which is an example of unwanted
behavior in a P2P networks. In this scheme, there is a need to have
trust information and past history of peers’ behavior to be able to
utilize reputation-based approaches. Reputation based scheme can be
employed in conjunction with other techniques for identification and
control of free riders. Most reputation-based approaches are similar, the
difference are mainly in the methodology of trust inference to determine
the trustworthiness of a peer, accuracy and complexity [96]. There are
several behavioral based systems for identification of free riders and/or
for encouraging contribution in P2P systems in the literature. For
example, see [67, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102].
In [97], the authors proposed a probabilistic resource allocation to node
using their reputation to overcome free riding. Each node resource
download is adjusted with its reputation so as to get an appropriate
quality of service. A node with low reputation is allowed to download a
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finitely low amount of resources. Furthermore, they proposed neighbor
selection based on interest and reputation so as to enhance cooperation
among peers with similar interest.
Researchers in [98] proposed a reputation based scheme called Barter-
Cast. In this model, a maxflow network is build in which a node repre-
sents a peer while the edges denote the aggregated amount of services.
Each peer constructs their local network based on the information ex-
changed with others. From this network, peers measure the upload
and download of other peers. This is based on a reputation metrics
designed on the maxflow graph proposed to measure a subjective repu-
tation. In addition, peers build a subjective share history from all the
local history exchanged with other peers in the network.
In [99], the authors proposed a free riding mechanism in a hybrid P2P
systems. They used super nodes to monitor the behavior of all peers
attached to it. Three variable are kept for each peer to measure service
provided, requested and rejected. Peers are progressively suspected if
there is an increment in its service rejection. The super peer uses these
information to queue service provisioning to each peer. Hence, with
this behavioural monitoring, free riders can be controlled.
In [67], the authors proposed a demerit point mechanism. In this ap-
proach, every peer maintains a list to record its interactions history
with other peers in its neighborhood. Each peer is expected to main-
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tain a threshold level of upload rate of reciprocation. If the rate is lower
than the expected predefined threshold, a demerit point is assigned to
that peer. A blacklisted peer will not be selected during the window
for random peer selection for download subsequently. Hence, reducing
the slots of free riders during the window.
In [103], the authors explored three approaches for trust based incen-
tive. These are, trust aware topology construction, trust-based cost
searching and trust-based dynamic topology optimization. They sug-
gested that peers be placed on the P2P topology based on their reputa-
tion. Such arrangement they claimed, encourages peers to contribute
more so as to be promoted to higher level in order to obtain better
service, improved performance and utilization of the networks.
The use of appraisal and blacklist is proposed in [100, 101, 102]. The
scheme used the activity set model to describe the activeness of a peer.
Each peer maintains a blacklist to record any dealing with free riding
peer and an appraisal is posted to every other peers in the network
in case of good deal. The authors carried out experiments with three
classes of free riders; namely selfish, trustworthy contributors and un-
trustworthy temporal contributors. The drawback of this approach is
the assumption that all peers are honest in their appraisals and black-
listing.
Trust aware topology is proposed in [104] to mitigate the effect of free
39
riding. The authors present an adaptive P2P overlay topology based
on partitioning of peers into super peers and ordinary peers. This par-
titioning made the computation of direct and recommendation trust
of each peer easier, thereby aiding in repelling malicious peers and re-
ducing free riding. Similarly, in [105], the authors proposed a 3-tier
hierarchical topology, where peers are classified into three categories,
based on performance, availability and contribution to the networks.
The classes are superpeers, trusted supervisors and normal peers. Su-
per peers are entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the normal
peers which are treated as new comers to the networks. They are mon-
itored for a while before being ”promoted” to the next level based on
the behavior, availability and performance. The authors claimed that
due to the hierarchy in the node degree of exit and entry, the mecha-
nism does not cause overhead to the networks. Moreover, topologically
closer nodes would be encourage to contribute more, hence decrease free
riding. However, they assumed trusted supervisors are always available
and obedient, which is not realistic in real P2P networks.
There are several challenges facing these approaches for effective perfor-
mance in the tracking of free riders. These challenges are, whitewash-
ing and sybil attack, the need for centralization, persistent identity and
communication cost [106, 5, 107, 108, 84]. The problem of whitewash-
ing and sybil attack. Due to the availability of cheap pseudonyms in
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the networks, a peer can always change it name and perform every
transaction with a new name. This will thwarts the effort to record its
unwanted behavior in the networks, even though the peer is free rid-
ing. Sybil attack is a situation where a peer generates several names of
itself. It then colludes to either falsely accuse an obedient peer to tar-
nish it image, or erroneously praise a malicious peer in other to boost it
reputation. For performance of reputation based approaches, there is
a need for some level of centralization such as the central authority to
manage the reputation database. This might become a bottleneck to
the networks which may cause a single point of failure and vulnerabil-
ity to attack. Moreover, if there is no persistent identity, it is difficult
to track anonymous peers. Also, putting a high cost on identity to re-
duce whitewashing, will deter genuine new entrant into the networks.
Furthermore, the cost of exchanging and storing the reputation infor-
mation might increases substantially in terms of bandwidth and storage
as the number of peers in the network increases.
2.5 Game Theory Based Schemes
Game theory has been found to provide a rich mathematical framework
for analysis of complex interactions that occur in all facets of life [109].
Game theory modelling is appealing to researchers of incentives and
interactions in P2P networks due to the fact that the difference of cost
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and incentives are natural net benefit that can easily be represented
as utility function. Also, the rationality assumption of game theory
that every players try to maximize their utility tends to fit exactly
the situations in P2P system [110]. Each peer in the network can be
viewed as a rational game player with his own strategies to maximize
his utility of the system. Game theory has been used in the literature
in an attempt to represent a peer with rational and diverse interest and
model their interactions in a P2P system.
In [66], the researchers presented a game model of interactions between
peers in a P2P systems. They assumed the network lifetime is infinitely
long, hence discretized time t = 0, 1, 2...∞. Every user is assumed to
be rational and pursue maximum payoff. A game is played during
each time period. In a game, nodes request service for themselves, and
decide whether to serve others or not. The authors assumed all peers in
the network are selfish. The contribution reputation of a peer is directly
proportional to what a peer can download in a given time period. They
studied the reputation changes of each peers as time progresses. A
constant ratio of benefit to cost is assumed in the simulation of their
utility function and for the computation of peer’s sharing probability.
The authors analyzed the pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibria
of the game. In the pure strategy game analysis, the authors posited
that the only Nash equilibrium in this game is (Don’t serve, Don’t
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serve). Which means that no service is provided to the network at all.
The authors claimed that this inhibit free riding as free riders has to
upload to be able to download equal measure.
The drawbacks of this work are; first, the use of binary value (0 = no
contribution and 1 = contribution) in every time period. This does not
cater for the size of the resources downloaded or uploaded by peers.
Second, the assumption that all players are selfish. This is highly un-
likely, since there are altruists that will always give resources to others
irrespective of what they get from the system. Third, the cost and
benefit may change as game progresses in real P2P systems. Fourth,
how the service information between peers are managed is not consid-
ered. Finally, repetition history is needed to be able to compute the
reputation.
In [65], the authors used game theory to model interactions between
any two peers in an unstructured P2P systems. They identified three
types of peers, namely, as altruist, in-between (altruist and free riders)
and free riders. They modelled the utility function Ui = utility derived
by peer i as a net gain, which is the difference between the benefit and
cost function ( f1(.) and g1(.)). An extra benefit function f2(Qu) is
assigned to altruists. These are based on subjective parameters such
as self esteem, self satisfaction, reputation, and additional TTL. The
utility function is based only on the size of file. The game model was
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analyzed oﬄine based on their assumptions. The model was simulated
using a predefined threshold, repetition history and complete informa-
tion. They studied the strategies between two interacting altruists,
two interacting free rider and between a free rider and an altruist. A
modified game model that uses reputation of resource contributions of
a peer is used to designed what they termed co-opetion framework to
enhance cooperation among peers. The researchers used fairness index
to evaluate the performance of their mechanism.
Though, this work is an improvement over [66] which uses binary
value for reputation measure per unit time, but there are shortcomings.
These includes; the ratio used to differentiate service do not discrimi-
nate effectively between peers as the sizes of files increases. The supply
of reputation information by the requesting peer to the providing peer
is prone to manipulation. The mechanism does not provide a window
for free riders to recover once their reputation goes beyond a certain
predefined threshold. The assumption that there is no illegal activities,
lying of peers is unrealistic. The real time variation of cost and benefit
is not modelled. Moreover, the authors do not consider activeness and
inactiveness of peers in their work. This may give rise to dormant net-
work, if peers are allowed to stay in the network for a long time period
without participating in network activities.
In [61], the authors presented a mathematical framework of incentives
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in P2P networks based on game theory. They modelled P2P network
as a discrete time system. They referred to peers’ utility as points. A
peer gains α points for receiving service and losses β point for providing
service. The number of services provided over time is used to differenti-
ate between different types of peers. Also, they proposed two learning
models for peers, namely, current best learning and opportunistic learn-
ing. In current best learning model, a peer chooses its strategy at the
end of every time slot using an adaption rate, in which peers learn
from others to make decision on sharing. On the hand, opportunis-
tic learning model, in this case, a peer randomly chooses a ”teacher”
to learn from in the network to make decision on sharing. Moreover,
the authors classified peers in P2P networks into cooperators, defectors
and reciprocators. Thereafter, they presented incentive models, which
are; mirror incentive, an analogy of tit-for-tat, proportional incentive,
where a peer serves requester with a probability equals to the peer’s
contribution to consumption ratio. In linear incentive model, a con-
stant generosity matrix is used to classify peers. A check in sharing
history by peer will determine whether to share or not. The authors
analyzed the robustness of each incentive model analytically. One of
the proposed model, the proportional incentive policy is used to in-
centived BitTorrent. Based on their experiments, they deduced that
free riders adapt their strategy by changing from defective to reciproca-
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tive. Furthermore, the researchers showed a relationship between their
model and evolutionary game model, specifically, the pairwise contest
population game. They concluded that there should be limit to degree
of altruism so as to encourage sharing. However, the use of constant
values to represent peers gain and loss limits this approach.
The authors in [64] proposed a stage game of chunk sharing in a mul-
timedia P2P sharing as a gift giving game [111]. They use asymmetric
interest of peers to support their choice of gift giving game instead of
Prisoners dilemma. The game is modelled as follows; it has two ac-
tions, {Serve = S,Notserve = NS}, If a = S, the server incurs cost c
and the client receives a benefit of r. If a = NS, both r and c equals 0.
They considered constant r and c for every chunk. They claimed it can
be extended to consider peer dependent and time varying cost. With
the assumption that r >c, and the ability of peers to have multiple
connections, the social utility U is the sum of all utility derived from
all connections. If a = NS, the short term equilibrium = 0 which is
undesirable for the utility of all system to be 0. This model is a single
stage game. To cater for subsequent interactions, the authors adopted
a repeated game model. Where each player can be identified with their
reputations. A trusted third party is assigned to manage the trust
information. Moreover, they analyzed the repeated game based on so-
cial norm and one shot deviation principle. The researchers concluded
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that based on their simulation and analysis, no peer gains by deviating
from socially acceptable norm. However, the true cost c may vary from
one peer to the other and may vary with time. Also, the assumption
that the benefit r is constant limits this model, though it may vary
depending on it content and peer, since benefit is highly subjective.
The authors in [106] adapted the prisoner dilemma to model incentives
in P2P networks. Each game consist of two players which can either
defect or cooperate. To present a social dilemma, one player is the
client and the other is the server in the game. The decision of the
server is meaningful in determining the outcome of the game. A player
can be a server in one game and a client in another game. The authors
used a constant points to represent the payoff of each player.
In [112], the authors represents the interaction of peers in P2P network
as a game theoretic model. They identified three forms of equilibrium
and concluded that though social optimality of public goods cannot
be reached if external incentives are not provided to the peers, some
sharers will be inherently generous to provides the contents needed
to maintain the networks. Hence, file sharing networks could reach
equilibrium in the presence of free riding, but the degree of free riding
that can be tolerated is not ascertained. They claimed that forcing all
peers in the networks to share may not yield the desired social optimal
outcome. To some peers, the cost of sharing may outweigh the benefits.
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The authors in [113] proposed a model of interactions between peers in
a P2P systems as a two player game. They present the repeated form
of the game and classified nodes as Enthusiastic, Selfish and Rational.
They proposed a graded punishment for peers based on their strategy.
However, there is no measure to safeguard the reputation from attack
or cheating.
In [114], a model of incentive with strategy and Nash equilibrium in
game theory is proposed. The strategy of a peer is its level of contribu-
tion and its utility is payoff which is expected benefit from other peers.
The authors proposed service differentials based incentive scheme where
a peer provides service to a peer based on his contribution to improve
the performance of the system. They show that two equilibria exist in
this form of game. Similarly, in [55], the utility function is made up
some variables such as download amount, network variety, disk space
used, bandwidth, altruism and financial transfer. With the assumption
that every peer is economically rational, they weigh the financial bene-
fit and the cost of sharing. However, there is a need for a fair exchange
mechanism to be agreed upon by the two peers in interaction in order
for the transaction to end successfully.
In [115], the researchers observed that the incentive mechanisms in
BitTorrent do not deter free riders enough. As free riders are able to
download as fast as non free riders. They proposed a modification of
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the choking algorithm as an iterated prisoners dilemma’s game. Every
peer maintains a record of upload amount and download amount in
all it connections. The difference of these two variables is multiplied
to a constant factor called nice factor. This is the factor a peer can
afford to risk for cooperation. The constant is assumed to be equal
to the size of a block. The nice factor is then adjusted to have the
following properties;(i) retaliatory, which means defect if the opponent
defect. (ii) Nice, that is never defect first.(iii) Forgiving, which connotes
cooperation if the opponent start cooperating after defection.(iv) clear,
which means inform the opponent of reciprocative behaviour. They
claimed their modified incentive mechanism is more robust against free
riding. However, the effect of seeders are not considered.
The researchers in [116] proposed a model to analyze the relationship
between user selfishness and system stability in file sharing P2P net-
works. The model is based on Prisoners dilemma game in which player
have two set of actions, defector and cooperator. The authors mod-
eled what they called caching game to represent P2P networks. In this
game, each player is a file holder with two set of actions, caching and
no caching. The game is an asymmetric complementary game with
complete information. In this regard, taking a different strategy of the
opponent will yield different payoffs. The strategy selection for each
player is controlled by the ratio of number of cooperators to the total
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number of peers in the system. Furthermore, the authors attempted to
cater for heterogeneity by relating their model to Evolutionary game
theory. In this case, they concluded that a dominant strategy displaces
weak strategy in the network. They assumed that every node is aware
of the behavior of all other nodes in the system. From their model
and analysis, they concluded that their is a relationship between users
cooperation and system robustness.
However, the requirement that players pass on their strategies to their
offsprings as time goes on does not correctly capture peers character-
istics. Since, in P2P systems every peer is an autonomous entity on it
own. The assumption that every player has the knowledge of the whole
system is not realistic. The possibility of one strategy displacing other
strategy with time no matter how high is the payoff is not realistic.
In [117], the authors modeled the resource sharing in P2P with Evo-
lutionary game theory with the claim that Nash equilibrium is hard
to compute and does not capture the highly dynamic nature of P2P
networks. The authors posited that the strategy of trial and error by
peers to share or not in which they learn over time is better. Since,
sharing is perform in a rational and uncertain manner but with mutual
interest. Moreover, they compared the resource sharing in P2P net-
work to stag hunt [118]. They concluded from their model that there
is a correlation between evolution and payoff matrix.
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In [110], the authors adapted oligopoly game to model incentive in a
P2P storage system. They represents the total desirable resource as
α, the market clearing price in oligopoly was defined as the difference
between α and the total contribution of resources. It is observed that
α and c are time variant quantities. They tailored the value of α and c
in the game to reflect P2P system. However, the authors posited that
is difficult to compute the total resource required oﬄine. However, the
system dynamics and interaction mode in real P2P systems affect this
modeling. For instance, in storage sharing, CPU sharing networks,
each peers contribution level affects the global resource availability.
Hence, if total contribution is optimal, further contribution of the same
resource would yield less utility. Generally, utility functions may vary
with time, due to variation in cost and benefit [110]. Similarly, it is
noted that in a P2P storage system, the cost may not be significantly
that of the storage but more of that of bandwidth consumed by peers
accessing the storage. There is cause-effect dynamics in storage P2P
systems between storage and bandwidth which is unknown. Hence,
representing this parameters and compute their value to reflect a real
system remain a daunting task.
In [39, 119, 120], the authors proposed a buddy incentive protocol for
BitTorrent. The buddy protocol is modelled as an infinitely repeated
game. In this model, leechers are only made to unchoke their buddies,
51
that is peers with the same download and upload rate. Randomly
giving a peer chance to download is only performed by leechers if it does
not have the data required by it buddies. The analytical game, model
the distribution of contents between leechers. The strategy choice for all
the players are independent player, that is a peer that runs the original
BitTorrent. A free rider, a peer that do not uploads to others and a
buddy aware peers. They formulated the utility function of leechers
to be U =d that is the average download rate for all leechers. Where
all players have different utilities according to their behaviors. They
prove that Nash equilibrium exist in their game model. Similarly, the
authors extended the utility functions in [119] to include honest peer
and dishonest peer and model same as game as presented in [120]. They
concluded that unfairness is reduced from their simulations. However,
seeders impact is not considered in both approaches.
In conclusion, we observed in our review that a good number of factors
may pose challenges to a generic game model for P2P systems. First,
heterogeneity of environments. Users of P2P systems are scattered
over a vast geographically distributed over the world. These users
have different computational power, storage capability and bandwidth.
Second, the presence of Altruists in the system also affect the rationality
assumptions. Altruists are peers that contribute to the common good
irrespective of their gain from the system. Third, variable factors such
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as cost, benefit variation, peer variational behavior and decisions under
uncertainties which are common in real P2P system poses challenges to
the design of utility functions. Fourth, interactions in real P2P system
is more complex than this model as peers cannot accurately predict the
need from another peer in the future. Fifth, heterogeneity of interest.
Each user in the system has different interest, need and objectives. For
instance, peer x may be interested in a resource owned by peer y, while
peer y may want resource from z. Peer z may be interested in resource
of x. Furthermore, behaviorally, peer x may be an altruist, peer y
may be a free rider while z may have behavior in between these two.
Hence, there is a need to take the architecture of the P2P system into
consideration in an attempt to model peer interaction as a game.
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CHAPTER 3
GAME THEORY
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present an overview of game theory. We introduce
the general concepts of playing a game and classify games based on
some criteria such as the amount of information available to players,
the manner in which the players choose their actions during the game,
how the game is being represented and number of players involved in
the game. This overview serves as a background to provide a better
understanding of our proposed game model. The remaining sections
of this chapter are arranged as follow. Section 3.2 presents the basics
of a game and its constituents. In section 3.3, game descriptions are
presented while some examples of games are discussed in section 3.4. In
section 3.5 a taxonomy of games is presented and section 3.6 concludes
this chapter with some game solution concepts.
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3.2 Game Basics
Games are played in numerous aspects of our life but we might not
be aware that we are playing a game [121]. Games are being played
in politics, market, war and daily interactions. For instance, a person
decision to choose restaurant A instead of B due to price and quality
of food offered, is playing a game. Economic activities such as auc-
tion, bargaining and price competition between firms offering the same
service or producing the same product are all games. Games are mod-
elled using game theory. Game theory has been found to provide a rich
mathematical framework for analysis of complex interactions between
players. In general, game theory models decision making in an interac-
tion between rational players. The rationality assumption shows that a
player has preferences and is aware of the consequences of his actions.
Each game must have one or more players. A player is a general entity
of interest which may be an individual, organization, country, or a
node in a network. A game must also have a non empty set of actions.
The overall plan of actions taken by a player is known as strategy.
The set of actions taken by a player in a game is determined by the
player’s strategy. For instance, one can view the strategy of a game as
a complete algorithm to play the game, while the actions of the game
are each step in the algorithm. The result of a particular action in a
game is known as payoff. Based on the strategy, an action or set of
55
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix for prisoner P1 and prisoner P1
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actions are taken in order to increase the payoff. A game should be
played according to the rules that specify how the game can proceed.
For example, consider a classical example of a game known as prisoners
dilemma. In this game, two crime suspects are remanded in prison for
interrogation. The players are prisoner (P1) and prisoner (P2). The
strategy of each prisoner is to spend less time in prison. Each prisoner
must take an action for the game to evolve. The set of actions available
to each prisoner are confess or not confess of the crime. The rules of the
game specify that prisoners are kept in separate cells and questioned
separately. The rules also specify the payoff a prisoner gets for taking
a particular action. Once a game is played by all players, the outcome
is jointly determined. As shown in Table 3.1, if P1 confesses and P2
confesses, the outcome of the game is (fP1
1
, fP2
1
). As such, the game
has four outcomes depending on the actions taken by the players.
3.3 Game Descriptions
In game theory, games are described using different representations.
These representations include normal form and extensive form. These
two representations differ in the type of game described, the amount
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and depth of information needed to be retained for convenience in anal-
ysis and to reduce computational complexity. A normal form game is
a representation of game that does not capture the notion of sequence
and time of the action. It is a game structure that is mathematically
simple, abstract and analytically convenient [122]. A normal form game
is represented with a payoff matrix. An example of a normal form rep-
resentation of game is as shown in Table 3.1. In the normal form repre-
sentation, some information such as action sequence and time about the
game may be lost but focuses our understanding on dominant strate-
gies, Nash equilibria and their payoffs [123]. For instance, consider a
game involving two players, if the moves per player is finite, this can be
reduced to a game with one move per player. The extensive form game
is an explicit representation of a game that captures the dynamics of
interactions of players and made the temporal structure explicit. This
complete description of a game is represented by game tree revealing
information such as; (i) complete descriptions of the set of players (ii)
the move of each player (iii) the time of the move of each player and the
choices made by those players (iii) complete description of the players’
knowledge as at the time of taking an action in the game and (iv) the
players payoff functions. Every extensive-form game can be converted
to an equivalent normal form game but this conversion process may
result into an exponential increase in the size of the representation,
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hence, making it computationally intractable [124]. An example of the
extensive form of matching pennies game is shown in Figure 3.1.
 
 
 
1 
2 2 
H T 
1 
-1 
1 
-1 
1 
-1 
1 
-1 
H T H 
T 
Figure 3.1: Extensive form representation of matching pennies game.
3.4 Game Examples
In this section, we present some classical game models to further illus-
trate the usage of game theory to model decision making. These game
models are widely used in the literature and they serve as classical
example to explain game theory concepts.
3.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The description of the prisoner’s dilemma game is as follows. Two
individuals are arrested over a serious crime. Each is known to be
guilty of a minor crime prior to this time, but there is no evidence
to convict them of the serious crime. The suspects are separated and
interrogated differently. During interrogation, each of them is told that
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if he testifies about the other’s guilt, he will get an amnesty of reduced
sentence for the crime committed. This game is modeled as follows.
If both suspects did not confess they both get a reduced sentence of
1 year and if neither of them confesses, they both get a sentence of 3
years. If a suspect testifies against the other, the suspect gets 0 year
and the other gets 4 years. The payoff matrix for this game is presented
in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Payoff matrix of Prisoners Dilemma
Prisoner2(Confess) Prisoner2(Dont confess)
Prisoner1(Confess) (3,3) (0,4)
Prisoner1(Dont confess) (4,0) (1,1)
3.4.2 Stag Hunt
This game describes an interaction where conflict and cooperation may
exist. Two hunters go out hunting for three possible preys which are, a
large stag and two hares. The only way to get a stag is for both hunters
to work together. However if one goes for the stag and the other goes
for a hare, the hunter that goes for the stag will end up with nothing
while the hunter that go for hares will get the two hare for sure. If both
hunters go for hares, each will get one; and therefore will have dinner
regardless of what the other has chosen. Although hunting a hare
produces less meat, it is potentially advantageous because it is really
easy. The assumptions of this model are; (i) there is no communications
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between the two hunters (ii) the stag yields more food than the hare
(iii) in any given scenario, at least one hunter is guaranteed food (iv)
both hunters are rational and equally informed (v) each hunter can
only bring equipment for one type of animal. The payoff of this game
is as shown in Table 3.3. It should be noted that the numbers in the
payoff matrix represents the value of the meat from the animals. If
both hunters hunt for stag, they both get 40. If one hunter goes for
stag alone, he will get 0, while the hunter that went for hare gets 20.
If both hunters hunt hare, they both get 10.
Table 3.3: Payoff matrix of stag hunt game
Hunter2(Hunt stag) Hunter2(Hunt hare)
Hunter1(Hunt stag) (40, 40) (0, 20)
Hunter1(Hunt hare) (20, 0) (10, 10)
3.4.3 Battle of Sexes
Battle of sexes is a two person game. Both players need to coordinate
their activities but they have different preferences. In this model, their
is a conflicting interest, but both husband and wife has to agree on
mutual gain. The game is described as follows. A couple plan to meet
at a cinema in the evening to watch a TV program . Both are separated
and driving to the cinema. They both forget on the plan and not sure
of the show to watch. Both cannot communicate but they prefer to
be together and watch the same show. The husband prefers football
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than opera and the wife likes opera much better than football. If the
husband watches the football with her, his payoff is 2; but if he watches
the opera with her, his payoff is 1; and if he goes to either of the places
without his wife, his payoff is 0. Similarly, if the wife goes to watch
the opera with her husband, her payoff is 2. But her payoff is 0 if she
ends up at the opera without him. If the woman joins the husband to
watch football, her payoff is 1. But her payoff is 0 if she ends up at
the football game without him. This scenario is represented as a game
with payoff matrix shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Payoff matrix of Battle of Sexes Game
Husband(Opera) Husband(Football)
Wife(Opera) (2, 1) (0, 0)
Wife(Football) (0, 0) (1, 2)
3.4.4 Matching Pennies
Matching pennies game is an attack-defense game with the following
description. Two people hold a coin and simultaneously choose to
reveal either Head or Tail on their coins. Player 1 loses his coin to
player 2 if both match, otherwise, player 1 wins player 2’ s coin. The
payoff matrix is shown in Table 3.5. One can observe clearly in this
game that it a real game of conflict. The gain of player 1 is the loss
of player 2 and vice versa. It is an example of two person, zero-sum
game.
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Table 3.5: Payoff matrix of Matching Pennies Game
Player2(Head) Player2(Tail)
Player1(Head) (-1, +1) (+1, -1)
Player1(Tail) (+1, -1) (-1, +1)
3.5 Game Taxonomy
Games can be classified based on the player, action, outcome, repetition
and termination as shown in Figure 3.2. For example, player-based
classification can be based on different criteria. These criteria could be
the number of players involved, the nature of players and the type of
information available to players.
 
 
 
 
Game classification      
Player Action  Outcome Repetition Termination 
Figure 3.2: Classification of game.
3.5.1 Player-based Game Classification
This game classification is based on ”who is playing the game”-the
player. The criteria related to this classification are number of players,
the effect of the identity of players on the outcome of the game, the
nature of cooperation type of players and the information availability
to players in the game as shown in Figure 3.3.
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Player-based Game 
Classification 
Nature of 
Players 
Players’ identity 
effect 
Information 
availability 
Number of 
Player (s) 
Figure 3.3: Player-based classifications of game
Game Classification Based on Identity Effects of Players
A symmetric game is a game in which the payoffs depend only on the
other actions employed and not on the player playing them [125]. The
identities of the player do not affect the payoffs. In other word, the
identities of the players can be changed without changing the payoff.
An example of a symmetric game is prisoner’s dilemma described in
section 3.4. Formally, a normal-form game is symmetric if the play-
ers have identical strategy spaces(S1 = S2 = ... = SI = S) and
ui(si, s−i) = uj(sj, s−j), for si = sj and s−i = s−j for all ǫ1, ..., I .
(s−i denotes all the strategies in profile s except for si.) Thus, we can
write u(t, s) for the payoff to any player playing strategy t in profile
s. We denote a symmetric game by the tuple [I, S, u()] [125]. On the
contrary, asymmetric games are games in which the strategies are not
identical for both players. Though, it may be possible sometimes for
an asymmetric game to have an identical strategy for both players. In
asymmetric game the identity of the players affect the payoff. For in-
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stance, if both prisoners in the prisoner’s dilemma game have different
payoffs for choosing the same action, then, it becomes an asymmetric
game.
Asymmetric Symmetric 
Player identity 
effect 
Figure 3.4: Player-identity effect classifications of game.
Game Classification Based on Number of Players
There are different types of games that may involve one, two or more
players interacting in a strategic setting as shown in Figure 3.5.
Two Player Game : This is also referred to as a two person
game. It involves two players interacting in a strategic environ-
ment. These are the most common category of game studied in
game theory. A special case of this class of games is N-Player
games. Some common examples of two player games are prisoners
dilemma, stag hunt and battle of sexes.
N-Player Game : This is also called multi player game. This
involves three or more players interacting in a strategic setting.
The analysis of this form of game is complex due to multiple and
complex decision made by several players. Most N-player games
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can be reduced to a two player game for simplicity of analysis.
Formally, N-person game is a set of n players or positions each
player with a finite set of pure strategies and corresponding to
each player a payoff function Pi which maps the set of all n-tuple
of pure strategies into real number [126]. An example of N-player
game is an n-player coordination game.
One-Player Game : In game theory, game occurs when there is
conflict of interest amongst the players. In one person game there
is no conflict of interest. Only a single player take decisions based
on its strategy to achieve it goal. This form of game is of no much
interest in game theory, but it may be interesting in probabilistic
and complexity term. A one player game is model as a decision
problem.
 
Number of players 
N-player Two-player One-player  
Figure 3.5: Number of player classifications of game.
Game Classification Based on Nature of Cooperation
As shown in Figure 3.6, the nature of cooperation of players involved in
a game can be used to classify game into cooperative, non cooperative
and coordination game. Non-Cooperative Game : Non-cooperative
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game is a class of games in which players make decisions indepen-
dently. Though players may choose to cooperate, cooperation must be
self enforced. As such, there is no external enforcement for each player
to plan actions with other group of players and take consensus-based
decisions. Also, a game is said to be non-cooperative if it is impossi-
ble for the players to communicate in any way. In other word, if each
player pursues self interest that may partly conflict with the interest of
other player, we said the game is non cooperative [127]. Furthermore,
in this type of games, players cannot make a credible commitment to
cooperate in their strategies. The basic model of interest in this form of
games is the individual player-including his interest, beliefs, preference
and possible actions [124]. Thus, non cooperative game theory deals
with the study of interactions of competing rational individuals. Ex-
ample of non-cooperative game is prisoners’ dilemma game since both
prisoners do not share information in taking their decisions. Both take
independent decisions without necessarily considering the opponent.
Cooperative Game : In cooperative games also known as coalition
games [124], the term cooperative implies that players have complete
freedom of communication and complete information on the structure
of the game. There is a possibility of making an enforced agreement
binding on one or both players to a certain policy. Co-ordination
with other members in the group of players is required in coopera-
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tive games [126]. The basic modelling unit in this class of game is the
group. In this case, the outcome of any chosen strategy is a joint deci-
sion by the group. Formally, cooperative games involve a set of players,
denoted by N = {1, ..., N} who seek to form cooperative groups, i.e.,
coalitions, in order to strengthen their positions in the game. Any
coalition S ⊆ N represents an agreement between the players in S to
act as a single entity [128]. Example of cooperative game is coordina-
tion game. In this case, players need to take a joint decisions, since the
game is between group of players.
Coordination Game : This is a class of games somewhat in-between
cooperative and non cooperative games. In these games, there exist
some element of cooperation and competition. This class of games
usually have multiple equilibria. Coordination games are formalization
of coordination problems. There are variations in coordination games
depending on the level of conflict of interest and preference with ref-
erence to the payoffs. In pure (common interest) coordination game,
both players prefer the same action. Hence, their preference will yield
a higher payoff than the other action in which they do not have same
preference. Another forms of coordination game is the one in which
both players get a better payoff if they coordinate, but less if they do
not. This is the case in the stag hunt game, see section 3.4. In general,
it is better for both hunters to coordinate their efforts, since the action
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pair (stag, stag) yield a higher payoff than the action pair (hare, hare),
but there is a risk. On the other hand, the actions (hare, hare) provide
less risk due to uncertainty of each hunter’s action. The strategy pair
(hare, hare) provides a higher expected payoff. As such, the payoff for
both hunters are the same if they coordinate their activities but differ
if they do not. Lastly, the conflicting interest coordination game also
refers to as Battle of Sexes as described in section 3.4. In this case,
both players have to agree on a mutual gain, though some compromises
exists.
 
Nature of Players 
Cooperative  Non-cooperative  Coordination 
Figure 3.6: Nature of player classifications of game.
Game Classification Based on Information Availability
Complete Information Game: The payoff functions and the strategy
sets of this type of game is a common knowledge. Hence, decisions are
based on the available knowledge to all the players in the game. The
players know each element in the game definition [129]. In incomplete
information game, none of the players knows the type and action of
the other until both of them makes their move [129]. In the other
word, the game being played is not a common knowledge. A game is
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said to be a common knowledge if the players know the structure of
the game and they are all aware that other player knows the structure
of the game and so on [130]. The difference between complete and
incomplete information game is that players in incomplete information
game or at least some of them, lack full information about the structure
of the game as define by it normal form [131]. Furthermore, by suitable
modelling and transformation all forms of incomplete information game
can be reduced to complete but imperfect information game.
Perfect Information Game : A game in which the state of the game and
all moves are known to all players are said to have perfect information.
The player with the move knows the full history of the game so far.
That is, the moves previously made by all other players. For example, a
game without chance element like Chess is a perfect information game.
On the other hand, in imperfect information game , the players do not
know the full history of previous moves made by others.
To clearly distinguish between the often confused concept of complete
and perfect, incomplete and imperfect information game. The author
in [129] differentiates them as follows, complete and incomplete infor-
mation deals with the amount of information the players have about
the rules of the game. On the other hand, perfect and imperfect infor-
mation deals with the amount of information each player has of other
players and their moves. Game classification based on information
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available to players is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Information availability to player classifications of game.
3.5.2 Action-based Game Classification
Games can also be classified based on the features of the set of actions.
The size of the action set which can either be finite or infinite. Also,
the occurrence of these actions and the payoffs associated with the
outcome as illustrated in Figure 3.8. A player in a game may choose
a pure action and apply it or randomize it, thus, resulting in pure or
mixed strategy game. Moreover, games may have a known outcome,
that is deterministic or may occur with known a probability distribu-
tions. Pure Strategy and Mixed Strategy , In this game, each player
selects a single action and apply it. The columns or rows of the payoff
matrix represent both an action and a pure strategy while in mixed
strategy, players randomize over the set of available actions according
to some probability distribution [130]. Formally, A mixed strategy for
player nǫP is a probability distribution say ξn = (ξni )iǫSn over his pure
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strategies in Sn. That is, (iǫSn) ξ
n
i and
∑
iǫSn
ξni = 1 [132]. The pre-
diction outcome of a mixed strategy is stochastic, hence less accurate
than the pure strategy. As such, the outcome is computed as expected
utility. Pure strategy can be seen as a special case of mixed strategies.
We will discuss this concept further in section 3.6 with battle of sexes.
Finite game is a type of game that each player has a finite number
of actions alternatives to choose, otherwise, the game is an infinite
game. As such, the player has a continuous action set, this might be a
vector of alternatives. Finite games are also known as matrix games.
Deterministic game : If the players’ actions uniquely determine the
outcome of the game, as captured in the objective functions, hence the
game is deterministic. On the other hand, if the objective function of
at least one player depends on an additional variable (state of nature)
with a known probability distribution, then the game is a stochastic
game [133].
3.5.3 Outcome-based Game Classification
As shown in Figure3.9, games can be classify based on their outcome.
In this class, we have constant-sum and non-zero sum game. Constant-
sum game: This is a type of game in which the sum of payoff of every
outcome of each player is constant. It is a game of pure competi-
tion. Poker game is an example of constant-sum game, since the total
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 Action-based game classification  
Size of action set Payoff associated with actions 
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Figure 3.8: Action-based classifications of game.
wealth of both players add up to constant. Zero-sum game, is a class
of constant-sum game in which the total gain for both players sum to
zero. Formally, given a two person game with one move per player.
If each player selects independently and simultaneously from the finite
set of action plan that results into a payoff for each player. Let i, j
be their independent choices, then the game is described by a real ma-
trix Xij = (xij) and Yij = (yij). Where xij is the payoff for player 1
and yij is the payoff for player 2. The game is zero sum if and only if
xij + yij ≡ 0 [123]. Thus, zero sum game is a real game of conflict,
a player benefits only at the expense of the opponent, hence, the gain
of one player equal the loss of the other player. Example of such game
are chess, poker, matching pennies. On the other hand, in non zero
sum game, the gain of one player may not necessarily be the loss of the
other player. As such, the payoff may not add up to zero. For instance,
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in prisoner dilemma, the sum of both players payoff may be greater or
less than zero, depending on the actions of both players.
 Outcome-based game 
classification 
Non-zero-sum  
Constant sum    
Figure 3.9: Outcome-based classifications of game.
3.5.4 Repetition-based Game Classification
Repeated Games : This is sometime referred to as supergame. It is a
scenario in which the same stage of strategic form of a game is played at
each time t for some duration of T periods. It is an infinitely repeated
game if T =∞ [134, 135]. A stage game is a one-period simultaneous
move game of complete information. Repeated game is used to study
interactions that goes on over time. Repeated game could be of perfect
monitoring. This means that at the end of every time period, every
player is aware of the action chosen by all other players at that period.
But in imperfect monitoring, the actions of other players are not ob-
servable. Unrepeated (one) shot games are games played once without
repetition.
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 Repetition-based Game 
Classification 
Unrepeated 
(One shot) 
Repeated 
Figure 3.10: Repetition-based classifications of game.
3.5.5 Termination-based Game Classification
The outcome of a game is determined at the end of the game. The
question here is what determine the end of the game ?. The end of a
game could be determine by time and action. Games can also be clas-
sified in the dimension of how does the game terminate as illustrated
in Figure 3.11. If a game is duration specified game, this is time con-
strained game in which the expiry of this designer specified duration
marks the end of the game. As in the game of soccer, two 45 minutes
make a complete 90 minutes regulation time. Also, the end of a game
could be determined by moves taken by either one or both players in a
two-player game. The action that determines the end of the game may
be taken simultaneously by both players or sequentially one after the
other.
Sequential (Dynamic) Game: The action is taken sequentially until a
particular point in the game or the player choose not to move further.
Players in dynamic games are aware of earlier actions of other players
74
Table 3.6: Example of Players-related Classification of games
Players-related Classification
Game/Criteria No. of players Nature of players Players identity Information availability
Prisoner’ Dilemma 2 Non-cooperative Symmetric Imperfect
Battle of Sexes 2 Coordination Symmetric Imperfect
Matching Pennies 2 Non-cooperative Symmetric Imperfect
Stag Hunt 2 Coordination Symmetric Imperfect
before taking an action. The order of play are strictly observed hence,
there is possibility of learning since players are aware of others’ actions.
The simplest case of a sequential game is a two player game with one
move each per player. In this case, the first player takes an action and
the second player takes it action after observing the action of the first
player. Examples of sequential games are auction, bargaining and price
competition.
Simultaneous (Static) Game: The actions in this category of game
are applied by all players simultaneously. The players might not take
the action exactly simultaneously but the second player is not aware
of the action of the first player while taking its action. Example of
simultaneous game is prisoners’ dilemma described in section 3.4.
As a summary, we classify the four classical games discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4 to fit our taxonomy. The classifications of these four games
are illustrated in Tables 3.6 - 3.9.
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Figure 3.11: Termination-based classification of game.
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Table 3.7: Example of Actions-related Classification of games
Actions-related Classification
Game\Criteria Size of actions Occurrence of actions Payoff associated with actions
finite infinite pure mixed deterministic stochastic
Prisoner’ Dilemma
√ √ √ √
Battle of Sexes
√ √ √ √
Matching Pennies
√ √ √ √
Stag Hunt
√ √ √ √
Table 3.8: Example of Moves-related Classification of games
Moves-related Classification
Game Sequential Simultaneous
Prisoner’ Dilemma
√
Battle of Sexes
√
Matching Pennies
√
Stag Hunt
√
3.6 Game Solution Concepts
3.6.1 Dominant Strategies
A strategy profile is an n-tuple S = (s1, ..., sn), one strategy for each
player and Ui(S) is the payoff for player i if the strategy profile is S.
A strategy si is said to be dominant over another strategy sj, if the
player will always do better by using si than Sj. That is, it always
give a higher payoff irrespective of the opponents actions. A strategy
si ∈ Si is strictly dominated for player i if there exists another strategy
s∗i ∈ Si such that for all s−i ∈ S−i, we have,
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) > ui(si, s−i) (3.6.1)
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Table 3.9: Example of Outcome-related Classification of games
Outcome-related Classification
Game Constant-sum Non-zero sum
Prisoner Dilemma
√
Battle of Sexes
√
Matching Pennies
√
Stag Hunt
√
According to equation 3.6.1, we say that s∗i strictly dominates si.
A strategy is said to be dominated if it yields a payoff less than or equal
to the payoff of some other strategy of the opponent. A strategy si ∈ Si
is a strictly dominant strategy for player i if it strictly dominates every
other strategy in Si. A strategy si ∈ Si is weakly dominated for player
i if there exists another strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that for all s−i ∈ S−i, we
have,
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) (3.6.2)
As shown in equation 3.6.2, s∗i weakly dominates si. A strategy si ∈ Si
is a weakly dominant strategy for player i if it weakly dominates every
other strategy in Si.
Let us illustrate these concepts with an example. Refer to the payoff
matrix of prisoner’s dilemma in section 3.6. The strictly dominant
strategy for prisoner 1 is confess, conversely, Dont confess is strictly
dominated by confess for prisoner 1. As observe from the payoff matrix,
confess will yield (3, 0) compared to Dont confess that will yield a
payoff (4, 1) irrespective of prisoner 2’s action. Similarly, a strictly
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dominant strategy for prisoner 2 is confess while the strategy Dont
confess is strictly dominated by confess for prisoner 2.
Table 3.10: Payoff matrix of Prisoners Dilemma
Prisoner2(Confess) Prisoner2(Dont confess)
Prisoner1(Confess) (3,3) (0,4)
Prisoner1(Dont confess) (4,0) (1,1)
3.6.2 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is an important concept in game theory analysis. It
is an action profile a∗ with the property that no player i can do better
by choosing an action different from a∗i , given that every other player j
adhere to a∗j [109]. Formally, the action profile a
∗ is a Nash equilibrium
if, for every player i and every action ai of player i, a
∗ is at least as good
according to player i’s preferences as the action profile (a∗, a∗i ) in which
player i chooses ai while every other player chooses a
∗
j . Equivalently,
for every player i,
ui(a
∗) ≥ ui(ai, a∗i ) ∀ action ai of player i (3.6.3)
Where ui is a payoff function that represent player i’ preference. In
other word, each player strategy is a best response to the strategies of
others, no player has an incentive to deviate to an alternative strat-
egy [130]. This is the stable point of the game in which each player
predicts the actions of others correctly. Hence, each player cannot
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gain by changing his strategy, keeping the strategies of other fixed.
Let us illustrate this concept with an example. Refer to the Prisoners
Dilemma [109] in section 3.6. In this case, the best choice for each
player is to confess. But note that irrespective of whatever suspect
1 does, it is better for suspect 2 to confess (3 <4) and (0 <1). The
strategy (confess, confess) yield 3 years jail term for both and strategy
(Dont confess, Dont confess) yield 1 year behind bar for both. The
Nash equilibrium of this game is that both confess. No single player
can gain by unilaterally changing his strategy.
There are game with none, one or multiple equilibria. In discussing
Nash equilibrium, we have to consider pure and mixed strategy sep-
arately. Some game might have an equilibrium in it mixed strategy
but non in it pure strategy form. Example of a game with one Nash
equilibrium is the prisoner’ dilemma. Some may not have Nash equilib-
rium in it pure strategy form such as in the case of matching pennies,
see section 3.4. In this game no player can predict the response of the
other player. However, equilibrium exists in the mixed strategy form.
Others might have multiple equilibrium as in the stag hunt game dis-
cussed in section 3.4. It has two equilibria. The Nash equilibria in
this game are the action profiles (stag, stag) and (hare, hare). These
can be referred to as payoff dominant equilibrium and risk-dominant
equilibrium respectively.
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Table 3.11: Payoff matrix of Battle of Sexes Game
Husband(Opera) Husband(Football)
Wife(Opera) 2, 1 0, 0
Wife(Football) 0, 0 1, 2
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We will explain this concept using the Battle of Sexes game discussed
in section 3.4. Suppose both husband and wife randomize their prefer-
ences. This means that they agree between them to alternate watching
opera and football. Let us view the game from the wife point of view,
and focus on how she evaluates her two pure strategies of definitely
watching football or definitely watching opera. Suppose the probabil-
ity of husband watching opera is p and football 1-p. The expected
utility of the wife’s action Uw is Uw(Football, Sh) = 0.p+ 1(1− p) and
Uw(opera, Sh) = 0(1 − p) + 2p , where Sh is the husband’s strategy.
If the wife randomize her two actions. It resulted into same utility.
0.p + 1(1 − p) = 0(1 − p) + 2p , so p = 1
3
. The husband’s mixed
strategy is Sh(Opera) =
1
3
and Sh(football) =
2
3
.
Similarly, the wife’s mixed strategy Sw is Sw(Opera) =
2
3
and
Sw(football) =
1
3
. At equilibrium, P (wife get 2, husband get
1)= 2
3
.1
3
= 2
9
P (wife get 1, husband get 2)= 1
3
.2
3
= 2
9
p(both get
0) = 1
3
.1
3
+ 2
3
.2
3
= 5
9
. Thus, the expected utility for each player is 2
3
.
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CHAPTER 4
BITTORRENT SYSTEM
BitTorrent is one of the most popular file sharing protocol implement-
ing P2P technology [69]. It has enabled a powerful community of large
content distributions [70, 71]. The BitTorrent system comprises of
the following components, tracker(s), peers and files. The tracker is a
server that coordinates sharing amongst interacting peers. The tracker
coordinates the sharing process by keeping track of file owners and
peers currently sharing files. A peer can either download or upload a
file. A peer with the complete file is known as a seeder, while a peer
with incomplete file is called a leecher. The set of all peers sharing a
particular file is known as swarm. For each file, there is only one swarm
kept by the tracker.
The whole file sharing process using BitTorrent can be divided into
three phases, file announcement, file downloading and peer status up-
date as shown in Figure 4.1. The file announcement phase involves
82
metadata creation which is the process of generating a metadata file
by the owner of the file. The metadata provides all the necessary in-
formation to share the file. The file downloading phase is subdivided
further into metadata discovery, peer discovery and file dissemination.
Metadata discovery involves the process of searching for the metadata
file. The process of peers finding each other to share a file is called
peer discovery. File dissemination includes peer selection and piece
selection, while peer status update involves providing updates to the
tracker by peers during file sharing. Subsequent subsections explain
each of these processes in detail.
 
BitTorrent file sharing phases 
File announcement       Peer status update 
Metadata 
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Peer 
discovery 
Event-based 
 
 File downloading 
File 
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Time-based 
Figure 4.1: Phases involved in uploading or downloading a file in BitTorrent.
4.1 File Announcement
The aim of this phase is to make the file available for sharing by the
file owner. For instance, if peer x wants to share a file using BitTor-
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rent, peer x divides the file into pieces of equal sizes. Typically, these
pieces are of sizes 16KB, 128KB, 256KB and 512KB. Afterwards, peer
x creates a .torrent file that contains filename, the number of pieces,
the length of a piece, creation date, and creator’s name. The hash of
each piece is also included in the .torrent so that the download can
be verified piece by piece. The .torrent also contains the URL(s) of
the tracker(s) obtained by searching tracker sites. Some examples of
tracker sites can be found in [136, 137]. Once the .torrent file is created,
it is uploaded to one or more torrent sites as well as to one or more
trackers. Torrent sites and tracker sites can be found using a search
engine. An example of metadata is shown in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.2
summarizes the steps involved in file announcement.
4.2 File Downloading
File downloading can be broken down into three phases, metadata dis-
covery, peer discovery and file dissemination. Each of these phases is
explained in detail in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Metadata discovery
When a peer needs to download a particular file, the peer retrieves
the .torrent file by using any search engine and searching for torrent
sites. Examples of torrent sites are Torrentz [138] and piratebay [139].
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Figure 4.2: File announcement steps.
Figure 4.3: An Example Metadata.
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Lastly, the peer contacts the tracker by sending a download request.
Information contained in the download request include total amount
uploaded, total amount downloaded, the number of bytes left to be
downloaded. The download request also contains event description
with these possible values; (a) completed, which is sent when the client
finishes downloading the complete file, (b) started, which is sent by a
client when it begins downloading and (c) stopped, which is sent when
a client stops downloading. Figure 4.4 summarizes the steps involved
in metadata discovery.
 
 
 
Search for the .torrent file 
Download the .torrent file 
Contact the tracker 
Figure 4.4: Metadata discovery steps.
4.2.2 Peer discovery
Peer discovery is done through the tracker which keeps statistics about
peers. A peer sends a download request to the tracker. The reason for
this download request is that a peer wants to join an existing swarm. In
this case, the peer will send announce request to the tracker. Moreover,
the peer may also send announce request to the tracker to ask for more
peer set. This occurs if the number of peers in the peer set drops below
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a set threshold, typically 20 [140].
The tracker responds to the peer with a set of peers known as peer set
containing randomly selected 50 peers [141]. It should be noted that a
peer set is a subset of the swarm and a peer in the peer set is known
as a neighbor. The peer set is sent as a ”text/plain” document con-
taining all the necessary information required by the peer to download
the file. The information contained in the ”text/plain” document in-
cludes; (a) peer key, which is a dictionary containing map list of peers.
Each map represents a peer with peer-id, peer-ip , peer-port-number,
(b) tracker-id, (c) complete which indicates the number of peers hav-
ing the complete file and (d) incomplete which indicates the number of
peers with the incomplete file. Consequently, the peer contacts these
peers specified in the peer set to initiate connection and commence file
dissemination.
4.2.3 File dissemination
In BitTorrent, the dissemination of files is done directly by peers with-
out the knowledge of the tracker. After receiving the peer set from
the tracker, peers connect to each other by sending handshake mes-
sages. This is followed by sending bitfield message to announce the
pieces initially each peer possesses. Consequently, each peer announces
a successfully downloaded and verified piece through a have message
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which is sent to all of its neighbors.
Once a provider announces a piece, the provider selects interested re-
questers by sending unchoke message. If the interested requester de-
cides to get the piece, the upload process starts by sending a piece
message to the requester.
At the requester side, the requester sends an interested message to the
provider if the requester is interested in any piece announced by the
provider. Once the requester receives an unchoke message from the
provider, then the requester sends a request message for a particular
piece and the download process starts. It should be noted that in case
of a situation where a peer sends many requests for the same piece, it
sends a cancel message as soon as it gets the piece. Furthermore, a keep
alive message is sent at regular interval to keep the connections between
two peers alive. The interleaving of messages between a provider and
a requester is illustrated in Figure 4.5. A summary of messages and
their descriptions during file dissemination, is as shown in Table 4.1
4.3 Peer status update
All peers in a swarm need to contact the tracker to update their sta-
tus. This update may be time-based or event-based triggered. In the
time-based update, each peer contacts the tracker periodically, typi-
cally every 30 minutes, to update the tracker of their status [141]. This
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Figure 4.5: Message interleaving during file dissemination.
status update might include updating a peer’s active status. In case of
a situation in which an existing peer in the swarm does not contact the
tracker after a predefined time, usually 45 minutes, the tracker removes
the peer from the swarm assuming the peer left the system [39]. In ad-
dition, in order to avoid overwhelming the tracker with requests and
updates, a predefined minimum interval of requests can be enforced.
This enables the tracker to update its statistics and maintain system
up-to-date active list. Furthermore, event-based update occurs when
a peer sends an update due to an occurrence of some events such as
stopped, indicating the peer stopped downloading. The event-based
update will also occur when a leecher sends a complete event to tell the
tracker to change its status from a leecher to a seeder.
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Table 4.1: BitTorrent messages
Message Description/usage
choke Notifying receiver of temporary refusal to upload
by the sender.
unchoke A notification message to indicate the willingness
of the sender peer to send a piece.
interested Indicates the sender is interested in the receiver’s
piece.
not interested Shows that sender is not interested in the receiver’s
piece.
have To inform others of file pieces the sender has suc-
cessfully downloaded and verified.
bitfield Sent immediately after a successful handshake. It
contains bitmap, using single bit to represent piece
availability.
request Used by the sender to request a piece.
piece This follows a request message which contains
piece index, length and the data requested.
cancel This is used to cancel request made.
handshake The first message to be exchanged by both peers.
4.4 Illustrative Example of File Sharing
The interaction process is depicted in Figure 4.6 and summarized into
the following listed steps.
(a) Peers use a search engine to search for torrent site(s) in order to
locate the .torrent file
(b) Peers download the .torrent file from torrent site(s)
(c) Peers contact the tracker for a peer set
(d) The tracker sends the peer set
(e) Peers select their neighbors and establishes connections with them
(f) When connection is established, the file dissemination process can
take place
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We use the following example to illustrate the file sharing process using
BitTorrent. Let us assume that peer 1 and peer 2 are interacting where
peer 2 is sharing file Fx and peer 1 is interested to download Fx. First,
peer 2 divides Fx into pieces and creates a .torrent file with the file
metadata. Peer 2 announces the .torrent file to one or more torrent
sites and trackers. When peer 1 retrieves the .torrent file and sends a
download request to the tracker, the tracker adds peer 1 as a leecher
to the swarm of Fx. The tracker replies to peer 1 with a peer set that
contains only peer 2. Let us assume that while peer 1 is downloading
from peer 2, a new peer (peer 3) joins the swarm of Fx. Peer 3 will get
a peer set that contains peer 1 and peer 2. Hence, peer 3 can download
pieces of Fx from peer 1 or peer 2 . Once a peer 1 or peer 2 completely
downloads Fx, the tracker changes their status to seeders in the swarm.
4.5 Piece Selection Strategy
In BitTorrent, files have different number of pieces depending on file
size and piece size. Peers download files piece by piece, hence there
is a need for a piece selection strategy. Selecting a suitable piece to
download is very important to the performance of the network. For
instance, if every peer in a peer set is downloading one piece owned
by only one peer, this will definitely slow down the entire download
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Figure 4.6: BitTorrent file sharing process.
process. There are piece selection mechanisms applying different se-
lection criteria, namely; rarest piece first, strict priority, random piece
first and end game.
i. Rarest piece first: Every peer maintains the list of all the copies
of each piece in its peer set. A rarest piece is the piece with the
fewest number of copies or owners in a peer set [141]. A peer using
this mechanism selects next rarest piece to download so that the
peer has the piece many other peers want to download. This will
also increase the possibility of peers offering pieces throughout the
downloading process and leave the common pieces to a later time
for download.
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ii. Strict priority: This mechanism is to ensure that once a piece
is selected, all the remaining blocks from that piece must be down-
loaded next before downloading other pieces. This will speed up
the download process since the verification can be done faster.
iii. Random piece first: A new peer that joins the swarm needs to
have a complete piece as soon as possible. This facilitates the new
peer to start as early as possible exchanging of pieces with other
peers.
4.6 Choking Algorithm
Since BitTorrent is a resource sharing environment, peers have to decide
with whom to interact. This is made through the choking algorithm.
Peers can randomly or intelligently select other peers to exchange pieces
with. In a BitTorrent environment, seeders and leechers have different
strategies which are applied at fixed intervals [86]. Choking is a term
used in BitTorrent meaning a temporary refusal to upload pieces to a
peer. This is to encourage other peers to share and cooperate.
As shown in Figure 4.7, every peer in the BitTorrent environment ap-
plies the choking algorithm at fixed time intervals to select peers and
give them chance to download. To achieve this, the algorithm is divided
into regular unchoke and optimistic unchoke as shown in Figure 4.8.
The regular unchoke is performed differently by seeders and leechers
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where as optimistic unchoke is performed in the same manner by seed-
ers and leechers. The regular unchoke is done every 10 seconds, and it
looks back to the last 20 seconds, whereas optimistic unchoke is done
every 30 seconds as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
The objective of regular and optimistic unchoke during every time in-
terval is to give a chance to unchoke other peers. A peer can unchoke
upto three peers during regular unchoke and one peer during optimistic
unchoke.
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Regular and optimistic unchoke is done in phases, namely candidate
selection, candidate sorting criteria, best candidate selection and un-
choke decision making. In the candidate selection phase, a peer selects
candidates from its peer set to be unchoked, where as in candidate
sorting criteria, the candidates selected are sorted based on either the
download or upload rate. Best candidate selection is used to select
the best candidates from the sorted candidates while during unchoke
decision making phase, a peer decides whether to unchoke the selected
best candidates.
4.6.1 Regular Unchoke
Regular unchoke is done by seeders and leechers every 10 seconds. In
applying the regular unchoke, seeders and leechers use the same can-
didate selection phase but they use different candidate sorting criteria,
different best candidate selection algorithm and different unchoke de-
cision making process.
Leechers Regular Unchoke
Each leecher maintains a list of its download rate from its neigbours.
During regular unchoke, every leecher runs regular unchoke algorithm
as shown in Algorithm 1. A leecher selects all the interested candidates
from its peer set as illustrated in lines 1 - 6. The leecher then sorts
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the candidates based on their upload rate to the leecher in the last
20 seconds and selects the top three uploaders as shown in line 7.
It should be noted that in regular unchoke, a leecher needs to select
the top three uploaders. If the leecher cannot select the top three
uploaders due to unavailability of record in the last 20, the leecher
then complements the top uploaders list with randomly choosing from
its peer set as illustrated in lines 9 - 11. As such, the leecher uses tit-for-
tat to reciprocate with others. After selecting the top three uploaders,
the leecher finally makes the unchoke decision as illustrated in lines
12 - 19. The unchoke decision is applied to all the selected top three
uploaders. The leecher checks whether it is snubbed by any of the top
three uploaders. A peer considers itself snubbed by its neighbor if the
peer downloaded from the neigbour but not in the last 60 seconds. If
the leecher is snubbed by any of its top three selected uploaders, the
leecher chokes that particular uploader, otherwise the leecher unchoke
the uploader. The leecher then chokes the remaining peers in it peer
set. Each leecher runs the snubbing algorithm in the last snub point
as illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Seeders Regular Unchoke
Each seeder maintains a list of its upload rate to peers in its peer set.
During regular unchoke, a seeder selects all the interested candidates
from its peer set. Then, the seeder sorts the candidates based on its
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Algorithm 1 Leecher regular unchoke algorithm
Frequency: Every 10 seconds
Input: List of all peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke zero to three peers and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is interested then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
// Candidate sorting criteria//
7: Sort all peers in CandidateSelected based on their upload rate to me in the
last 20 seconds
//Best candidate selection//
8: Select upto three top uploaders from CandidateSelected
9: if the number of interested peers is less than < 3 then
10: Complement the remaining by randomly selecting from the peer set
11: end if
// Unchoke decision making//
12: for every peer among the three best candidates selected do
13: if the peer did not snub me then
14: Unchoke peer
15: else
16: Choke peer
17: end if
18: end for
19: Choke the rest of the peers in the peer set
97
  
 
 
 
Time (seconds) 
0 60 120 180 
Snub point 
Figure 4.9: Snubbing algorithm time intervals.
upload rate to them in the last 20 seconds. Thereafter, the seeder se-
lects the top three downloaders as its best candidates. However, in
case the top candidates selected by the seeder are less than three, the
seeder complements the best candidate list with randomly choosing a
peer from its peer set. This may occur if the seeder does not have three
upload records of the candidate selected in the last 20 seconds, or the
interested candidates are less than three. During the unchoke decision
process, the seeder unchokes the three top candidates. It should be
note that seeders do not apply snubbing algorithm during their un-
choke decision making phase because they do not require to download
from any peer in their peer set. Also, seeders select based on its upload
rate to those top downloaders and unchokes them. The objective of
the seeder is to search for fast downloaders in the last 20 seconds so
as to distribute its pieces as fast as possible to many leechers to be-
come seeders and will reduce the load on original seeders. The regular
unchoke algorithm applied by seeders is shown in Algorithm 2.
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As a summary, the phases of regular unchoke for seeders and leechers
are illustrated in Figures 4.10 and 4.11.
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Algorithm 2 Seeder regular unchoke algorithm
Frequency: Every 10 seconds
Input: List of all peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke three peers and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is interested then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
//Candidate sorting criteria//
7: Sort all peers in CandidateSelected based on their download rate from me in
the last 20 seconds
//Best candidate selection//
8: Select three top downloaders from CandidateSelected
9: if the number of interested peers is less than < 3 then
10: Complement the remaining by randomly selecting from the peer set
11: end if
//Unchoke decision making //
12: Unchoke the three best candidates selected
13: Choke the rest of the peers in the peer set
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4.6.2 Optimistic Unchoke
Optimistic unchoke is run by seeders as well as leechers in the same
manner. Optimistic unchoke refers to random selection of one peer
to unchoke. This helps in searching for a better peer to compete for
one of the best candidates. Optimistic unchoke also facilitates the
bootstrapping of new peers joining the swarm without any piece to
exchange with others [39].
Algorithm 3 Seeder and leecher optimistic unchoke algorithm
Frequency: Every 30 seconds
Input: List of all choked peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke one peer and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is choked then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
7: Randomly select one peer from CandidateSelected
//Unchoke decision making //
8: Unchoke the selected peer
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Optimistic unchoke is carried out in every 30 seconds by both seeders
and leechers as shown in Algorithm 3. The one peer selected during
the optimistic unchoke is added to the unchoked top candidates only
for the next 10 seconds. After that, regular unchoke is applied as
shown in Figure 4.12. The peer has no candidate initially from time
0. Between the 10th and 20th seconds, the peer has three candidates
from the regular unchoke at time 10. This continues until the 30th
seconds, when the first optimistic unchoke is run by the peer to add one
additional peer in addition to the three from the regular unchoke ran at
time 20. As from 30th second till the 40th seconds when the next regular
unchoke will be run, the peer has four connections. Once the peer runs
the next regular unchoke at 40th seconds, three peers are unchoked and
the rest will be choked. Hence, the peer’s connection returns to three
until the next optimistic unchoke and the cycle continues.
As shown in Figure 4.13, in optimistic unchoke, the candidate is se-
lected from all the choked peers in the peer set. There is no sorting
criteria as the best candidate is selected randomly from the candidate
list, hence candidate sorting criteria is not applicable (NA). Finally,
this selected peer is unchoked. The summary of optimistic unchoke
steps is presented in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.12: Regular and Optimistic unchoking time intervals.
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CHAPTER 5
CHOKING ALGORITHM
GAME MODELLING
5.1 Overview
The goal of choking algorithm is to improve the performance of Bit-
Torrent [86, 67, 68]. Peers should maximize the utility of available
resources, motivate others to contribute and resist free riding behav-
ior [39]. In this chapter, we use game theory to model the choking
algorithm so that peers can determine their best strategy to interact
with others. The overall objective of our game model is to inhibit free
riding, increase fairness and encourage resource contribution. This is
necessary to ensure a fair and stable BitTorrent system.
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5.2 Motivation
Despite the popularity and the continuous usage of BitTorrent as a
file sharing system [142, 67, 68], it is bedeviled with some challenges.
Developers and researchers alike are exerting efforts to address these
shortcomings and improve the performance of one of the most successful
P2P protocols today [67, 68, 39]. Among researchers, free riding in
BitTorrent has been a widely acknowledged problem [39, 67, 68, 72].
Free riders misuse the BitTorrent environment through both optimistic
and regular unchoke.
The optimistic unchoke algorithm has been fingered as one of the weak-
nesses of BitTorrent [67, 68, 143, 115, 144, 120] since selecting a peer
to unchoke is random and does not consider reciprocity. On the other
hand, the optimistic unchoke is vital and crucial in BitTorrent and is
needed for better performance [144]. This is because new peers get
their initial pieces through the optimistic unchoke. Moreover, opti-
mistic unchoke is the opportunity to shop for better peers in terms of
bandwidth and pieces. Because optimistic unchoke is run by seeders
and leechers, free riders take advantage of seeders and leechers alike
during the optimistic unchoke.
Free riders also exploit regular unchoke executed by seeders. Analyz-
ing Algorithm 2 in Section 4.6.1, free riders can be members in the
candidateSelected set and also can be selected among the three best
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candidates either due to their download rate or due to the random se-
lection. Since, a seeder always unchokes the three best candidates, free
riders will be unchoked if they are members in the three best candi-
dates.
Furthermore, free riders exploit regular unchoke executed by leechers.
Analyzing Algorithm 1 in Section 4.6.1, free riders can be members
in the candidateSelected set. Free riders can also be selected among
the three best candidates either: (a) due to zero upload rate of all the
peers in the candidateSelected set or (b) due to the random selection
to complement the three best candidates. Once a free rider is selected
amongst the three best candidates, a free rider has an advantage over a
non-free rider. A free rider never snubs whereas a non-free rider might
snub a leecher. Therefore, a free rider among the three best selected
peers is always unchoked by a leecher whereas a non-free rider among
the three best selected peers might be choked or unchoked.
5.3 Motivation for Using Game Theory in
Modelling BitTorrent Choking Algorithm
In a P2P environments, there are peers and resources. Due to the
nature of P2P environment, peers compete with each others to for
resource and attempt to maximize their profit and minimize their
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cost. Therefore, P2P is an environment with players that compete
for resources. These scenario fits well in game theory. Resources in
P2P environments such as BitTorrent have been likened to common
goods in Economics [6]. Game theory is the most used tool in the
study of interactions between rational players in Economics. Similarly,
game theory provides a rich analytical framework for researchers of
P2P interactions and incentives as a modeling and analysis tool. Re-
cently, the increase in the application of game theory in P2P modeling
can be attributed to the need to have a mathematical framework for
the design and analysis of the growing P2P online community. Re-
searchers [110, 117, 66, 116, 64, 61, 65] claimed that game theory is
a natural choice for this task of modeling these vast and complex de-
cision making interactions due to the following. (i) the structure of
utility functions in game theory that allows benefit to be modelled in
terms of gain and cost. In addition, game theory provides avenue for in-
corporation of other approaches. This suitability of game theory mod-
eling that allow plug in of other approaches strengthened its position
amongst other approaches. For instance, trust, reputation, incentives
and reciprocity are deeply studied and used in game theory. Similarly,
they are all required in the study and modeling of P2P systems. (ii)
the availability of existing game models that have been studied exten-
sively in game theory which can easily be adapted to the economics
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of P2P (iii) the uncertainties that exist in economics which are best
modeled with game theory also arise in P2P interactions. These uncer-
tainties in decision making in P2P can also be suitably modeled with
the aid of game theory (iv) the rationality assumption that every player
will always pursue their maximum gain in game theory suits P2P en-
vironment (v) game theory framework provides formal representation
of interactions in P2P systems (vi) game theory allows the analysis
of P2P system equilibrium and therefore can stand on its own in the
model and study of P2P interactions.
5.4 The Game Model
In this section, we model the choking algorithm as a game. In our
model, we assume that peers are rational. This means that every peer
would pursue its maximum profit. This is in accordance with the as-
sumptions of game theory [65].
Peers gain or incur cost when downloading resources they want or up-
loading resources others have requested. Each peer gains when receiv-
ing resources. We express the downloaded quantity of resources as Qd.
Therefore, the gain function is expressed as g(Qd). In the same man-
ner, peers incur cost when uploading resources of quantity Qu. Hence,
the cost function is expressed as c(Qu). As such, the payoff is expressed
as g(Qd)− c(Qu) and depends on whether a peer has chosen to upload
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or download resources.
As shown in Figure 4.7, Section 4.6, a peer performs regular unchoke
and optimistic unchoke every 10 and 30 seconds, respectively. As such,
a peer plays a game every 10 and 30 seconds as long as the peer is part
of the BitTorrent environment. It should be noted that every third
ten-second period, a peer plays two games, one is the ten-second game
and the other one is the thirty-second game.
In our model, each peer can be one of four types, Initial Seeder (IS),
Experienced Seeder (ES), Leecher (LE), and Free Rider (FR). The ISs
are peers having the complete file since the time of joining the peer
set and are always sharing with their neighbors. Therefore, ISs do not
send download requests and they are only uploaders. Peers having an
incomplete file (i.e., missing pieces of the file) are called LEs. That is,
LEs send download requests to download the missing pieces and might
share the pieces they have. When LEs get the complete file, they are
called ESs. The ESs do not send download requests and they might
share with their neighbors. The last peer type is FRs. This type of
peers does not share with any other peer but sends download requests
to get pieces from others. Therefore, they have a selfish behavior.
Free riders exploit the lack of reciprocation with seeders, since seed-
ers only upload to others. Therefore, once a free rider becomes one
of the three best candidates, it will keep on downloading without con-
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tributing. To overcome this shortcoming, we were motivated to divide
seeders into ISs and ESs. This is done to minimize the effect of free
riders through seeders since both ISs as well as ESs allocate their band-
width to others but they use different selective strategies to inhibit free
riding.
5.4.1 Game Model For Initial Seeder
Every 10 seconds, ISs play the following game. In this game, ISs play
against all interested neighbors in the peer set. The strategy of ISs
is to upload to neighbors such that the standard deviation among the
neighbors in terms of the number of uploaded blocks is minimized. The
formula of standard deviation is shown in 5.4.1.
SD =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N−1∑
i=1
(xi − x)2 (5.4.1)
Where x is the mean of the number of blocks downloaded by each
neighbor, N is the size of the peer set and xi is the number of blocks
downloaded by neighbor i.
Since ISs are always sharing, their bandwidth is basically allocated for
others. Hence, ISs ignore the cost incurred when uploading to others.
Therefore, c(Qu) = 0. Since, self satisfaction is the gain for ISs, the
payoff function for ISs is expressed as g(Qu).
In a nutshell, the game played by ISs has the following components:
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Table 5.1: Game Model: Initial Seeder to an opponent
Opponent (Choke) Opponent (Unchoke)
Initial Seeder (Choke) (0,0) (0,0)
Initial Seeder (Unchoke) (g(Qu), g(Qd)) (g(Qu), g(Qd))
Set of player = {interested neighbors as well as the IS}
Strategy = upload to neighbors such that the standard deviation
among the neighbors in terms of the number of uploaded blocks is
minimized
Set of actions = {choke, unchoke}
Payoff function = g(Qu)
An IS can play against any other peer type except ISs and ESs. Since
an IS does not require to download from others, it will treat all of its
opponents the same. Table 5.1 shows the game model of an IS with an
opponent. If the IS unchokes an opponent, the IS will gain by assuring
that its payoff function is achieved. Otherwise, the IS will choke the
opponent. On the other hand, if the opponent is unchoked by the
IS, the opponents payoff is g(Qd). Otherwise, the opponent will gain
nothing.
5.4.2 Game Model For Leecher
Every 10 seconds, LEs play the following game. In this game, the set
of players are all the interested peers in the peer set. These interested
peers may include other LEs and FRs. The strategy used by LEs is tit-
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for-tat. When a LE uploads, the LE incurs a cost expressed as c(Qu).
A gain is expressed as g(Qd) a LE get when downloading. Tables 5.2
shows the game model when LEs play against LEs. When both LEs
choke each other, no one gains and no one incurs cost. Also, when
both LEs unchoke each other, both LEs gain is proportional to the
quantity downloaded. Consequently, both LEs incur the associated
cost of uploading to the other. However, if one LE unchokes the other
LE while the other chokes the same LE in return, the unchoked LE
will gain by downloading without incurring a cost. In that case, the
LE that carry out the unchoke will incur the cost of uploading.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.3, in a game with a FR, if a LE
chokes a FR, both LE and FR gain nothing. This occurs irrespective
of whether the FR chokes or unchokes the LE. The LE’s gain is always
0 since FRs do not upload to others. However, if a LE unchokes a FR,
the FR gains by downloading from the LE while the LE incurs the cost
of uploading to a FR.
The game components played by a LE are as follows:
Set of player = {interested neighbors as well as the LE}
Strategy = tit-for-tat
Set of actions = {choke, unchoke}
Payoff function = g(Qd)− c(Qu)
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Table 5.2: Game Model: Leecher to Leecher
Leecher (Choke) Leecher (Unchoke)
Leecher (Choke) (0,0) (g(Qd), c(Qu))
Leecher (Unchoke) (c(Qu), g(Qd)) (g(Qd)− c(Qu)), g(Qd)− c(Qu))
Table 5.3: Game Model: Leecher to Freerider
Free rider (Choke) Free rider (Unchoke)
Leecher (Choke) (0,0) (0,0)
Leecher (Unchoke) (c(Qu), g(Qd)) (c(Qu), g(Qd))
5.4.3 Game Model For Experienced Seeder
Every 10 seconds, ESs play the following game. In this game, ESs
play against all interested neighbors in the peer set. The strategy
of ESs is tit-for-tat. Since ESs do not download, their bandwidth is
basically allocated for others but ESs’ strategy dictates that if there is
no reciprocation history with the opponent, then the opponent should
not use the bandwidth. As such, ESs incur cost when uploading to FRs.
Therefore, c(Qu) is only ignored if uploading to LEs. When uploading,
ESs will gain g(Qu).
In a nutshell, the game played by ESs has the following components:
Set of player = {interested neighbors as well as the ES}
Strategy = tit-for-tat
Set of actions = {choke, unchoke}
Payoff function = g(Qu)− c(Qu)
An ES can play against any other peer type except ISs and ESs. Table
5.4 shows the game model of an ES with a LE. If the ES unchokes a
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LE, the ES will gain by assuring that its payoff function is achieved.
Otherwise, the ES will choke the LE. On the other hand, if the LE is
unchoked by the ES, the LEs payoff is g(Qd). Otherwise, the LE will
gain nothing.
Similarly, Table 5.5 shows the game model of an ES with a FR. If the
ES unchokes a FR, the FR will gain by downloading from the ES. The
FR’s payoff is g(Qd). In addition, the ES incurs an associated cost for
uploading to a FR. The ES’s payoff is g(Qu) − c(Qu). On the other
hand, when both ES and FR choke each other, both gain nothing.
Though, the ES does not need to download.
Table 5.4: Game Model: Experienced Seeder to Leecher
Leecher (Choke) Leecher (Unchoke)
Experienced Seeder (Choke) (0,0) (0,0)
Experienced Seeder (Unchoke) (g(Qu), g(Qd)) (g(Qu), g(Qd))
Table 5.5: Game Model: Experienced Seeder to Free rider
Free rider (Choke) Free rider (Unchoke)
Experienced Seeder (Choke) (0,0) (0,0)
Experienced Seeder (Unchoke) (g(Qu)− c(Qu)), g(Qd)) (g(Qu)− c(Qu)), g(Qd))
5.4.4 Game Model Every Thirty Seconds
When an IS wants to play a thirty-second game, the set of players
consist of all choked neighbors in the peer set plus the IS himself. The
IS’s strategy is to discover better peers to become seeders as soon as
possible. This strategy also assists in bootstrapping new peers. The
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IS randomly selects a choked peer and unchoke it. This is a game of
chance in which the outcome might be a failure or success. The IS
gains if the outcome of the random selection is a success, that is, the
selected peer is new or will be among the top downloaders, otherwise
the outcome is a failure.
In addition, LEs and ESs play a game every 30 seconds which is basi-
cally the same as the game they play in every ten-seconds. The only
difference is the set of players, which are all choked neighbors in their
peer set.
5.5 Model Implementation
The proposed choking algorithm game is played by all peers in every
10 and 30 seconds in the life time of their interactions. To apply their
strategies, players need information. The information base for players
in this game is the number of blocks downloaded or uploaded from their
opponents. This is proportional to the number of choke and unchoke
messages. This is similar to the technique used in [145] that monitors
the have messages from the regular BitTorrent in their study of effect
of locality in reducing BitTorrent traffic. Each player choose an action
to apply based on its strategy. The number of blocks uploaded to the
target peer by the source peer and the number of blocks downloaded
by the source peer from the target peer are the information peers used
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in this game. With these information available to all players in the net-
work, it serves as the information base for them to make their decision
during the game.
Initial Seeder Game Implementation
The IS is an upload only player that does not receive pieces from other
peers. To attain its’ strategy of minimizing the standard deviation
in term of number of blocks uploaded to peers in its peer set, an IS
carry out the following steps during every 10 seconds as illustrated in
Algorithm 4. An IS maintains the records of uploaded blocks to all
peers in its peer set. It selects all interested peers in its peer set as
candidates as illustrated in lines 1 - 4. Then, the IS sorts them based
on the number of blocks uploaded to these candidate during the sharing
process this is illustrated in line 7. Thereafter, it selects three neighbors
with the least number of blocks as best candidates as illustrated in line
8. However, in case interested candidates are less than three, the IS
complements the best candidates by randomly selecting a peer from
its peer set as shown in line 9 - 11. This arises if the IS does not
have three upload records of the candidates selected or the interested
candidates are less than three. In the unchoke decision making phase,
the IS unchokes the three top candidates selected and choke the rest
peers in its peer set as illustrated in line 12 and 13 respectively. Let
us illustrate this process with an example. Consider the numbers in
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Table 5.6 as the number of blocks uploaded by an IS to its interested
peers in its peer set P1, P2. . .P8 so far. During this game, the IS will
select peer P4, P5 and P3 as the three best candidates and unchokes
them.
Table 5.6: Number of blocks uploaded by an IS to its neighbors
Peer P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9
No of blocks uploaded 100 50 5 0 68 0 78 62 12
During the thirty-second period, the ISs need to play a game to select
one of its neighbors. As presented in Algorithm 5, the IS does not have
a sharing experience with any peer in its peer set and hence, it always
select one choked peer in its peer set and apply the action unchoke.
This strategy gives new peers the chance to get some pieces from the
IS. This action of IS is the same as the optimistic unchoke for seeders
in original BitTorrent. However, FRs will also get unchoked through
this window, but the effect is minimal since the number of IS in the
network are always few compared to the number of LEs.
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Algorithm 4 Initial Seeder Ten-second game
Frequency: Every 10 seconds
Input: List of all peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke three peers and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is interested then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
//Candidate sorting criteria//
7: Sort all peers in CandidateSelected based on the number of blocks downloaded
from me
//Best candidate selection//
8: Select three peers from CandidateSelected such that the standard deviation
among the peers in terms of the number of uploaded blocks is minimized
9: if the number of interested peers is less than < 3 then
10: Complement the remaining by randomly selecting from the peer set
11: end if
//Unchoke decision making//
12: Unchoke the three best candidates selected
13: Choke the rest of the peers in the peer set
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Algorithm 5 Initial Seeder Thirty-second Game
Frequency: Every 30 seconds
Input: List of all choked peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke one peer and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is choked then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
7: Randomly select one peer from CandidateSelected
//Unchoke decision making //
8: Unchoke the selected peer
Experienced Seeder Game Implementation
An ES uses tit-for-tat as the strategy. Though presently they do not
require to download, ESs use their past experience in deciding which
action to take. During the ten-second game, an ES selects three of its
interested peers in its peer set as candidates. Then, it checks if it has
an upload information for each of the selected candidate. Thereafter,
the ES game is as shown in Algorithm 6. If the selected peer does not
have any interaction with the ES, then the ES unchoke the peer. This
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is to give new comers the opportunity to get pieces. Otherwise, the ES
has downloaded from the peer while the ES was a LE, the ES unchokes
the peer.
Algorithm 6 Experienced Seeder Ten-second Game
Frequency: Every 10 seconds
Input: List of all peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke zero to three peers and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is interested then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
//Candidate sorting criteria//
7: Sort all peers in CandidateSelected based on their download rate from me in
the last 20 seconds
//Best candidate selection//
8: Select up to three top downloaders from CandidateSelected
9: if the number of interested peers is less than < 3 then
10: Complement the remaining by randomly selecting from the peer set
11: end if
//Unchoke decision making //
12: for every peer among the three best candidates selected do
13: if my upload to the selected peer is zero then
14: Unchoke peer
15: else if my download from the selected peer is not zero then
16: Unchoke peer
17: else
18: Choke peer
19: end if
20: end for
21: Choke the rest of the peers in the peer set
The ES uses the same strategy and the same payoff function in the
ten-second game for the thirty-second game as depicted in Algorithm 7
but with different set of players. The ESs use their experience during
their interaction as LEs to apply their strategy. An ES selects one of its
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choked neighbors randomly then checks if it has an upload information
for the selected peer. If this is not the case, the ES unchokes the peer.
This is to give room to new peers to download. Otherwise, the ES
checks if it has downloaded from the peer while it was a LE if this is
the case, the ES unchokes the peer. If all fails, the ES selects a new
neighbor randomly and leave the earlier selected neighbor as choked.
This is done not to waste this cycle of 30 seconds interval without
unchoking a peer.
Algorithm 7 Experienced Seeder Thirty-second Game
Frequency: Every 30 seconds
Input: List of all choked peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke one peer and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is choked then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
7: Randomly select one peer from CandidateSelected
//Unchoke decision making //
8: while the selected peer is choked do
9: if my upload to the selected peer is zero then
10: Unchoke peer
11: else if my download from the selected peer is not zero then
12: Unchoke peer
13: else
14: Select another peer from CandidateSelected
15: end if
16: end while
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Leecher Game Implementation
Leechers are peers that still need one or more pieces in order to down-
load the complete file and they use tit-for-tat strategy to exchange
pieces.
During the ten-second game, a LE selects three of its interested peers in
its peer set as candidates. Then, it checks if it has interacted with each
of the selected candidates. In the unchoke decision making process,
the first thing that the LE checks for is if the selected peer snubbed
the LE. If that is the case, then the LE chokes the selected peer. If
the LE does not have any interaction with the selected peer, then the
LE unchokes the peer. This is to enable new peers to bootstrap. On
the other hand, if the LE has downloaded from the peer, the the LE
unchokes the peer because the LE’s strategy is tit-for-tat. Otherwise,
the LE has not downloaded from the peer before and is not meeting
the peer for the first time, then the LE chokes the peer. The LE’s
ten-second game is as shown in Algorithm 8.
As shown in Algorithm 9, the thirty-second game played by LE is
similar to the ten-second game with the same strategy, the same set
of actions and payoff function. However, the game is played with a
different set of players. During the thirty-second game, a LE selects
one of its choked neighbors randomly. The LE then checks if it has
not uploaded to the selected peer before. If this is the case, the LE
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unchokes the peer assuming the peer is new. This initial unchoke is
to bootstrap new peers as well as the first action in the LE tit-for-
tat strategy. On the other hand, if this is not a new peer to the LE,
it checks if it has downloaded from the peer, if this is the case, the
LE unchokes the peer. Otherwise, the LE choked the peer and select
another choked peer for a new round of game. The LE selects another
peer so as not to waste this 30 seconds time period with out unchoking
a peer.
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Algorithm 8 Leecher Ten-second Game
Frequency: Every 10 seconds
Input: List of all peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke zero to three peers and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is interested then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
// Candidate sorting criteria//
7: Sort all peers in CandidateSelected based on their upload rate to me in the last 20
seconds
//Best candidate selection//
8: Select up to three top uploaders from CandidateSelected
9: if the number of interested peers is less than < 3 then
10: Complement the remaining by randomly selecting from the peer set
11: end if
// Unchoke decision making//
12: for every peer among the three best candidates selected do
13: if the peer snubbed me then
14: Choke peer
15: else if my upload to the selected peer is zero then
16: Unchoke peer
17: else if my download from the selected peer is not zero then
18: Unchoke peer
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Algorithm 9 Leecher Thirty-second Game
Frequency: Every 30 seconds
Input: List of all choked peers in the peer set
Output: Unchoke one peer and choke the rest
//Candidate selection//
1: CandidateSelected←− {}
2: for all peers in the peer set do
3: if a peer is choked then
4: CandidateSelected←− CandidateSelected+ peer
5: end if
6: end for
7: Randomly select one peer from CandidateSelected
//Unchoke decision making //
8: while the selected peer is choked do
9: if my upload to the selected peer is zero then
10: Unchoke peer
11: else if my download from the selected peer is not zero then
12: Unchoke peer
13: else
14: Select another peer from CandidateSelected
15: end if
16: end while
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CHAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
6.1 Overview
We conducted a series of performance evaluation experiments to as-
sess our proposed game model of the BitTorrent choking algorithm.
We started the performance evaluation process by examining the Bit-
Torrent choking algorithm to show the vulnerability of the BitTorrent
choking algorithm. This is discussed in subsection 6.6.1, we further
examined the causes of such vulnerability subsection 6.6.2. Section 6.7
evaluates our proposed game model through a series of experiments to
show its effectiveness as compared with the BitTorrent choking algo-
rithm.
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6.2 Performance Metrics
The objectives of a free riding mitigation mechanism are to ensure
cooperation among participating peers and also ensure fairness amongst
all peers in the system [39, 65]. Therefore, we focused our performance
evaluation experiments on the following:
To show the vulnerability of the BitTorrent choking algorithm.
To understand the root causes of the BitTorrent choking algorithm
exploitation.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed game model in in-
hibiting free riding in BitTorrent.
With these objectives in mind, we conducted our evaluation experi-
ments using the following metrics.
Conversion Rate: We define the conversion rate at time t of peer
type x, CRx(t), as the number of peer type x converted to seeders,
N sx over the number of peer type x, Nx. The conversion rate is
computed as shown in equation 6.2.1.
CRx(t) =
N sx
Nx
× 100 (6.2.1)
Number of Unchoke Messages: This is a measure of the actual
number of unchoke messages sent by peer type x to peer type y
and is expressed as UN yx .
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Download Time: This measures the download time for a peer
type and is calculated as follows:
DTx =
∑i=Nx
i=1 DT i
Nx
(6.2.2)
Where DTx is the download time for peer type x and Nx is the
total number of type x peers.
6.3 The Simulation Model
There is a need for a robust simulator to simulate a P2P environment,
analyze and modify the BitTorrent protocol. We conducted our exper-
iments using PeerSim [146], one of the most popular P2P simulators
[147, 148, 149, 150] and BitPeer [151], a BitTorrent module for Peer-
Sim. In addition to being open source, PeerSim in conjunction with
BitPeer have been used recently in several published articles such as
[147, 148, 149, 150, 69, 152, 153, 154].
6.3.1 PeerSim
PeerSim is a simulation engine for P2P systems. It is designed to be
highly robust. This is achieved through the use of modular program-
ming approach that offers pluggable components for researchers. It
provides easier interfaces for design, analysis, protocol modification and
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algorithms in P2P systems. PeerSim architecture comprises of Nodes,
Control, and Protocols. A node is a container for protocol. It defines
the behavior of every peer in the network with the use of protocol stack.
The protocol stack manages the state and actions of each node. For ex-
ample, one can simulate an overlay network or a distributed algorithm.
We utilize the protocol simulation feature of PeerSim and simulated
the BitTorrent protocol using BitPeer. PeerSim offers interfaces called
Controls used to perform global initialization, observation and perfor-
mance analysis. An example of these controls is the Observer used to
collect statistics for performance analysis. Controls can also be used to
modify the state of other entities such as adding and removing a node.
The exogenous and design parameters for each experiment are speci-
fied using a configuration file. The configuration file is an ASCII text
file that made up of three main parts, namely, general setup, protocol
definition and control definition. A sample configuration file is shown
in figure 6.1.
6.3.2 BitPeer
BitPeer [151] is an event driven BitTorrent protocol that runs on top
of PeerSim. We will use the entries in the sample configuration file
as shown in figure 6.1 to explain each of the BitPeer components and
associated parameters. Note that lines begin with # are used as com-
130
Figure 6.1: A PeerSim sample configuration file.
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ment and ignored by the simulator. The entries in the configuration
file are in the following format
<init|protocol|observer|dynamics>[parameter name]<parameter
value>
Lines 2 - 9 provide the general simulation and network setup. The
network size is the total number of nodes in the network including the
tracker. The simulation time and the number of experiments are set
in line 3 and 6 respectively. Line 9 specifies that the protocol uses the
general node in PeerSim. Second, the protocol definitions are specified
in lines 11 - 20. These include some BitTorrent specific parameters.
The protocol uses the uniform random transport delay in PeerSim with
minimum and maximum delay of 10 and 400 ms, respectively. The
protocol name is bittorrent. The bittorent specific parameters included
are file size, maximum swarm size, peer set size, duplicated request and
maximum growth.
file size: This is the total size of the file to be shared by peers in
the BitTorrent environment.
maximum swarm size: This is the maximum number of collabo-
rating peers.
peer set size: This is the number of neighbors sent by the tracker
to every node that joins the BitTorrent environment and indicates
the number of neighbors a peer has access to.
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duplicated request: This specifies the number of duplicate request
messages a peer can send during unchoke. For instance, if the value
is 3, it indicates that when a peer is unchoked, it can send requests
to 3 different peers for the same piece.
maximum growth: This specifies the limit of allowable expansion
to the network in a dynamic network. For example, if the network
size is 100 and max growth is 50, then this shows that the network
can be expanded to accommodate 150 nodes.
Lines 22 - 26 specify the network initialization parameters. All ini-
tialization lines begin with the key word init. The bittorent network
initializer, where the tracker and all the peers are initialized is specified
in line 22. The newer and seeder distributions specify the initialization
of peers with zero and complete pieces respectively at the start of the
simulation. Finally, lines 28 - 40 define the controls which are either
used to observe or modify the objects in the network. There are two
types of controls specified, observer and dynamics. The bittorent pro-
tocol observer is specified in line 28. The protocol to observe and
frequency of observation are specified in line 29 and 30, respectively.
The dynamic control starts from line 32 to 40.
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6.4 Simulating Free riding in BitTorrent
Free riders have been defined as non contributing peers [39, 65, 67, 120].
A free riding behavior can be exhibited by peers in a P2P system in
different ways. For example, in [65], a peer declares its reputation
to others who decide whether the peer is a free rider. This approach
assumes that peers are honest. In our work, we simulated FRs as follow:
(a) FRs do not announce to other peers in the peer set any piece they
have. This means that, free riders do not send have messages to others
in their peer set, (b) At the time of handshake with others, FRs do not
announce to others, through their bitfield, the initial pieces they have.
Consequently, the bitfield messages sent by FRs contain only zeros.
6.5 Simulation Setup
We extended the BitTorrent protocol [151] by changing the choking
algorithm as described in chapter 5, section 5.5. The design parame-
ters used in the simulation are listed in Table 6.1. The term randomly
generated over a range[a,b] means that the number is generated us-
ing a discrete (integer-valued) uniform distribution over a, a+1, ..., b
inclusive. This is written as U[a,b]. Whereas the term randomly gen-
erated over [x,y,z] means that the number is generated using a discrete
(integer-valued) uniform distribution over x, y and z inclusive.
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Table 6.1: Simulation design parameters
Design parameter Definition Design parameter value
How many times the simulation is repeated
for each point in the graphs 5
Number of trackers 1
Number of peers 100
Number of seeders [5%,10%]
Number of free riders [30%, 70%]
Bandwidth allocated to peers U[640Kbps, 1Mbps, 2Mbps, 4Mbps]
File size 100MB
Number of pieces 390
Peer set size 50
Piece size 256KB
Number of pieces allocated to leechers
and free riders U[10% - 90%]
The design parameters repetition, number of tracker and number of
peers are set deterministically at 5, 1, and 100, respectively. The num-
ber of seeders is set deterministically at [5%,10%] of the number of
peers. The objective of varying the number of seeders is to examine
the effect of seeders on the performance of the model. The number of
free riders is set deterministically at [30%,70%] of the total number of
peers. The objective these two extreme values is to assess the agility of
the model as the number of free riders increase. Allocated bandwidth
to peers is randomly generated over [640Kbps, 1Mbps, 2Mbps, 4Mbps].
File size, number of pieces, peer set size and piece size are set determin-
istically at 100MB, 390, 50 and 256KB, respectively. Allocated number
of pieces to LEs and FRs is randomly generated over the range [10%,
90%] of the number of pieces.
135
6.6 BitTorrent Vulnerability
6.6.1 BitTorrent Exploitation
The purpose of this section is to show how FRs exploit BitTorrent.
We first, run experiments to show that indeed FRs exploit BitTorrent.
Then, we examine the root causes of such exploit.
Figure 6.2 shows the conversion rate of LEs and FRs using 5% SEs and
30% FRs. The figure clearly shows that FRs are converting to SEs at a
faster rate than LEs. This is unfair since these FRs do not contribute
to the BitTorrent community and they are only 30 compared to 65%
LEs.
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Figure 6.2: Using 5% SEs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
Figure 6.3 shows the conversion rate of LEs and FRs using 5% SEs and
70% FRs. FRs are converting to SEs also at a faster rate than LEs
converting to SEs since FRs are the majority 70% compared to 25%
LEs. This is because SEs initially will most likely select FRs since they
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Figure 6.3: Using 5% SEs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
are the majority. Once FRs are selected by SEs, they will be always
selected since their download rate from SEs will be among the top
candidates. Therefore, SEs will be selecting FRs and this delays LEs
further. Although LEs can exchange pieces among each other, they are
only 25% of the community and do not have all the pieces.
We observe that the conversion rate of FRs are consistently higher than
that of LEs even with 10% SEs as shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. The
conversion rate for FRs when FRs are 30% is faster than when FRs are
70% because resource providers are 70% when FRs are 30% and only
30% when FRs are 70%.
Furthermore, we conducted experiments to measure the download time
of FRs and LEs. By measuring the download time of FRs and LEs,
we can compare their download times. Even if the download time
of FRs and LEs are the same, we can conclude that the system is
not fair since again FRs do not contribute to others. Furthermore,
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download time can be used to measure system robustness as proposed
in [119]. The authors in [119] define Robustness as the degree to which
a system is able to deliver good service despite the presence of FRs. In
a robust system, increasing the numbers of FRs should not be able to
significantly affect the performance of LEs. Figure 6.6 shows the that
BitTorrent is not robust. That is, increasing the number of FRs delays
the download time of LEs.
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Figure 6.6: Using 5% SEs: Download time for FRs and LEs.
In summary, we conclude that it is unfair for FRs that do not upload
pieces to others to surpass LEs in their rate of conversion or in their
download time. FRs have an advantage over LEs since FRs utilize
all their bandwidth for download while LEs use their bandwidth for
download and upload. If this problem is not addressed, selfish behavior
will be encouraged which negates the principle of P2P systems.
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6.6.2 Exploitation Root Causes
Figure 6.7 shows the number of unchoke messages sent by SEs to FRs
and LEs. Though, we observe that SEs are unchoking LEs at a higher
rate than FRs. SEs sent almost 24000 unchoke messages to LEs and
about 5000 to FRs. But there are 65% LEs and 30% FRs. This shows
that FRs exploit the system.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
U
n
ch
o
k
e
 M
e
ss
a
g
e
s
FRs
LEs
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
6
0
0
7
0
0
8
0
0
9
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
3
0
0
1
4
0
0
1
5
0
0
1
6
0
0
1
7
0
0
1
8
0
0
1
9
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
5
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
U
n
ch
o
k
e
 M
e
ss
a
g
e
s
Time (sec)
Figure 6.7: Using 5% seeders and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by seeders.
As shown in figure 6.8, LEs sent about 19000 unchoke messages to other
LEs. However, FRs received about 4000 unchokes from LEs. Although,
LEs use tit-for-tat in the existing BitTorrent, FRs are able to download
from LEs.
Figure 6.9 shows the number of unchoke messages sent by SEs to FRs
and LEs. SEs are unchoking FRs at a higher rate than LEs. SEs sent
almost 7500 unchoke messages to FRs and just above 3000 to LEs since
there are 70% FRs and 25% LEs. Since FRs are the majority, there is
a significant reduction in the total number of unchoke messages due to
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Figure 6.8: Using 5% seeders and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs.
the fact that FRs do not send unchoke messages.
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Figure 6.9: Using 5% seeders and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by seeders.
As shown in figure 6.10, LEs are sending unchoke messages to FRs. We
observe that LEs sent about 7000 unchoke messages to FRs. Though
FRs are the majority with 70% while the 25% LEs received 6000 un-
choke messages. LEs are expected to exchange pieces through recipro-
cation but FRs are able to exploit LEs.
In summary, we observe that FRs receive unchoke messages from both
LEs and FRs. These results reveal the exploitation points for FRs. FRs
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Figure 6.10: Using 5% seeders and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs.
that do not contribute resources to others are still able to download
from both LEs and SEs.
6.7 Game Model Effectiveness
Here, we show that our proposed model based on game theory is effec-
tive in mitigating FRs in terms of fairness, robustness and agility. In
this section, we will use the following notations. FRs before (FRs-B),
FRs after (FRs-A), LEs before (LEs-B) and LEs after (LEs-A). Here,
the word before means before applying our proposed game model (i.e.,
using the BitTorrent module, BitPeer, with FRs injected but no mod-
ifications to the choking algorithm). Similarly, the word after means
after applying our game model modifications to BitPeer.
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Figure 6.11: Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
6.7.1 Game Model Fairness
Figure 6.11 shows the conversion rate of free riders before (FRs-B) and
free riders after (FRs-A) using our game model. At time 1800 seconds,
almost 90% of FRs converted to seeders but after applying our game
model, only 60% of them converted to seeders. As such 30% of them
were delayed. This is done to FRs without much negative effect on
LEs.
Figure 6.12 shows the conversion rate of free riders before (FRs-B) and
free riders after (FRs-A) using our game model. At time 1800 seconds,
almost 50% of FRs converted to seeders but after applying our game
model, only 25% of them converted to seeders. As such 25% of them
were delayed. This is done to FRs much less negative effect on LEs.
It should ne noted that the conversion rate (in general) is much lower
than figure 6.11 since providers are 40% less than figure 6.11.
Figure 6.13 has the same pattern as of figure 6.11. FRs are seriously
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Figure 6.12: Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
delayed while LEs are not much impacted even with 10% ISs. The
same can be said about figure 6.14 with 70% FRs.
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Figure 6.13: Using 10% ISs and 30% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
In summary, our proposed game model shows its effectiveness from the
fairness point of view in delaying the conversion of FRs without much
impact on LEs for two extreme cases when the BitTorrent community
has 30% and 70% FRs.
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Figure 6.14: Using 10% ISs and 70% FRs: Conversion rate of FRs and LEs.
6.7.2 Game Model Robustness
To show the robustness of our proposed game model, we evaluated
download time with 30% and 70% FRs and compared the results with
what was obtained in subsection 6.6.1. From figure 6.15, it can be
drawn that FRs are delayed in downloading the file when the game
model is applied even with 70% FRs. We also compared the results
of our proposed solution with the results obtained in figure 6.16 to
examine the impact of our solution on LEs. As shown in the figure,
LEs are not affected when FRs are 30% of the BitTorrent community
but rather their download time improved significantly. On the other
hand, when FRs are 70%, the download time is increased, although by
not much, for LEs. This is due to the fact that 70% of the community
are only consumers. Therefore, LEs have only 30% of the community
and yet FRs are competing with them for obtaining service from 30%
providers.
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Figure 6.15: Using 5% ISs: Download time for FRs.
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Figure 6.16: Using 5% ISs: Download time for LEs.
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6.7.3 Game Model Agility
To understand the agility of our proposed game model, we analyzed
the number of unchoke messages sent to FRs and LEs by ISs, ESs and
LEs. Let us examine this when there are 5% ISs with 30% FRs and
also with 70% FRs.
Game Model Agility with 30% FRs
Figure 6.17 shows the number of unchoke messages sent by ISs to FRs
and LEs. ISs are unchoking LEs at a higher rate than FRs. ISs sent
almost 4000 unchoke messages to LEs and only about 500 to FRs since
there are 65% LEs and only 30% FRs. This is also due to the fact
that ISs are selecting their candidates based on minimizing the stan-
dard deviation in terms of number of blocks given to these candidates.
Therefore, FRs are delayed by ISs since they are the minority.
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Figure 6.17: Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ISs.
As shown in figure 6.18, ESs are almost refusing to unchoke FRs since
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ESs use their experience when they were LEs. For sure when an ES
was a LE, it did not download anything from a FR. Therefore, FRs
are paying the price for not sharing. On the other hand, ESs unchoke
LEs at an increasing rate since as time increases, the number of ESs
increases and the number of LEs decreases.
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Figure 6.18: Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ESs.
Figure 6.19 shows that LEs are unchoking LEs at a sharp increasing
rate. At time advances, the number of LEs decrease and this increase
rate slows down. LEs are unchoking LEs because they apply a tit-for-
tat strategy in order to cooperate with others.
Game Model Agility with 70% FRs
Figure 6.20 shows the number of unchoke messages sent by ISs to FRs
and LEs. ISs sent almost 1800 unchoke messages to LEs and about
2800 to FRs. ISs sent more unchoke messages to FRs than LEs. This
is expected, since there are 25% LEs and 70% FRs. ISs select their
candidates based on minimizing the standard deviation in terms of
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Figure 6.19: Using 5% ISs and 30% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs.
number of blocks given to these candidates. Therefore, FRs are the
majority it is expected that they get higher unchoke messages than
LEs.
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Figure 6.20: Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ISs.
As shown in figure 6.21, ESs almost refused to unchoke FRs. The num-
ber of unchoke messages sent by ESs to FRs is almost 0. As expected,
ESs use their experience while they were LEs and refused to unchoke
FRs. It is known that ES did not download from the FRs while the
ES was a LE. Therefore, FRs are paying the price for not uploading
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to the LE that turns ES. On the other hand, ESs unchoke LEs at an
increasing rate since as time increases, the number of ESs increases and
the number of LEs decreases.
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Figure 6.21: Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by ESs.
Figure 6.22 shows that LEs are unchoking LEs at a sharp increasing
rate as well as FR initially. At time advances, the number of unchoke
messages remains constant at 3000 for FRs. FRs are the majority in
this case, they got unchoked by LEs initially but with time the LEs stop
unchoking them. On the other hand LEs are unchoking LEs because
they apply a tit-for-tat strategy in order to cooperate with others.
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Figure 6.22: Using 5% ISs and 70% FRs: Unchoke messages sent by LEs.
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In summary, we compare Figure 6.7 having the existing choking algo-
rithm with SEs to figure 6.17 and figure 6.18 where we separated SEs
into ISs and ESs.
Considering the number of unchoke messages sent by SEs to FRs. The
unchoke messages in figure 6.7 is much higher than that in figure 6.17
and figure 6.18 combined. It is obvious from the results in figure 6.18
that ESs are punishing FRs for not sharing as the number of unchoke
messages from ESs to FRs is almost 0. This punishment received by
FRs from ESs are due to the experience of the ESs while they were
LEs. This shows the effectiveness of our proposed game model for
ES. However FRs do get some unchoke messages from ISs, since ISs
do share their blocks with the objective of minimizing the standard
deviation in terms of block distribution. Furthermore, the number of
unchoke messages sent by SEs to LEs is lesser in 6.7 compared to the
combined unchoke messages of ISs and ESs to LEs as shown in figures
6.17 and 6.18. As for LEs, the number of unchoke message received
from both ISs and ESs are higher. This is due to the fact that our
game model uses tit-for-tat for ES, since LEs are sharing they will get
unchoke messages from ES.
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.19 shows the number of unchoke messages sent
by LEs before and after modifications to FRs. We observe from the
results that LEs are punishing FRs by cutting down their unchokes
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messages by half from about 4100 to 2000. This is because FRs do
not upload resources to the LEs. Also, the number of unchoke mes-
sages from LEs to FRs seems to be high because there could be several
unchoke before the complete pieces are downloaded. But if it happens
that LE unchokes a FR initially, as time progresses then the LE applied
it experience when it turns to ES and stop unchoking FRs.
On the other hand, the number of unchoke messages sent by LEs to
LEs before and after as shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.19 are almost the
same. This is an indication that our game model does not hamper the
tit-for-tat strategy that is required of all peer.
Similarly using 5% IS and 70% FRs, we compared the number of un-
choke messages sent by SEs to LEs and FRs. Figure 6.9 shows the
number of unchoke messages sent to LEs and FRs before applying our
game model.
We observe from Figures 6.20 and 6.21 are the number of unchoke mes-
sages sent by ISs and ESs respectively to FRs. Note that the unchoke
messages sent by SEs to FRs in Figure 6.9 is higher due to the fact
that after modifications, the SEs are divided into ISs and ESs. Also,
we observe from the results that ESs are punishing FRs for not shar-
ing as the number of unchoke messages from ESs to FRs are almost
0 shown in figure 6.21. However FRs do get some unchoke messages
from ISs, since ISs block distribution is based on the objective of min-
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imizing the standard deviation. FRs are the majority 70%, hence they
got unchoked by ISs which is expected. on the other hand, the number
of unchoke messages sent by SEs before to LEs in figure 6.9 increases
from 3100 to about 5300. The increase results from additional messages
from ESs to LEs which are not in the existing algorithm.
As shown in figure 6.10, LEs are sending unchoke messages to FRs. We
observe that LEs sent about 7000 unchoke messages to FRs compared
to around 3000 in Figure 6.22. Though FRs are the majority with
70% while the 25% are LEs. FRs unchoke messages were reduced by
50% after implementing our game model. Furthermore, we observe
that majority of the unchoke messages sent by LEs to FRs were at the
initial stage of the sharing interaction. As time increases, the FRs could
not receive more unchoke from LEs, hence the value become constant
as shown in Figure 6.22. On the other hand, the number of unchoke
messages sent by LEs before and after remain approximately the same.
This is as a result of tit-for-tat strategy to which LEs adhered to.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This chapter summarizes the conclusion drawn from the work carried
out in this thesis in section 7.1. Section 7 summarizes the contributions
of this thesis while section 7.3 suggests area of possible improvement
and future directions.
7.1 Conclusions
In our study of free riding in distributed systems, we conclude that free
riding does not occur in all distributed systems. Free riding arises in
distributed systems in which the resources shared have public subscrip-
tions. Based on our study, client-server system in which the resources
are provided by the clients and P2P systems are the two distributed
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systems where public subscription resources lead to free riding. But
free riding is not a major issue in client-server due to the availability of
servers that can easily be tailored towards the control of free riding in
this system. On the other hand, free riding in P2P system is a concern
and it is a challenging problem to solve due to lack of node management
and node control policy.
In a resource rich P2P system with high number of altruist. For in-
stance, a BitTorrent system with a high number of seeders, free riding
of few peers should not be of major concern. On the other hand, in an
environment with an average number of resource providers, there is a
need for an effective free riding mitigation techniques.
On the use of game theory to study free riding in P2P systems. Game
theory offers some advantages by providing a framework that other free
riding mitigation approaches such as reciprocity and reputation can
be incorporated to games theory approaches to provide a better free
riding mitigation capability. Moreover, in using game theory to model
free riding solutions, it better to model the game based on architecture
specific as we did in BitTorrent. A generic game model for P2P systems
might not capture some architecture specific behavior.
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7.2 Summary of Thesis Contributions
Through out this work, we conducted a study on the problem of free
riding in distributed systems in general. A further study is carried out
specifically on free riding in BitTorrent system. The thesis contribu-
tions are summarized as follows:
Taxonomy of distributed systems : We studied in detail the
characteristics of distributed systems. As a result of our study,
we compared distributed systems and proposed a node-based to
clearly classify distributed systems based on node ownership, node
controlling policy, node management and node discovery mecha-
nism. This analysis and comparison resulted into the first contri-
bution of this thesis which is a taxonomy of distributed system to
clearly differentiate them. We believe this taxonomy will improve
our understanding of distributed system.
Game taxonomy : We present a detail background on games and
discusses game basic and components. Based on this background
work, we proposed a taxonomy of games. This taxonomy will
serve as a reference knowledge not only to researchers in this field
of study but also to researchers that may be interested in game
theory in their respective discipline.
Choking algorithm game model : We present a detail insight
into the mechanisms and algorithms in BitTorrent system and pro-
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posed a novel free riding mitigation techniques for BitTorrent based
on game theory. Our experiments show that the proposed model
performs better than the existing choking and optimistic unchok-
ing in BitTorrent.
Performance evaluation : In this phase, we carried out exten-
sive simulation studies to understand the original BitTorrent proto-
col behavior. In our study, we conducted experiments to highlight
BitTorrent’s exploitations by free riders as well as pointing out the
vulnerability points that made free riding possible. Moreover, we
extended the BitPeer module by simulating a free riding behavior
in BitTorrent. Finally, we implemented our proposed game model
and evaluated its performance.
7.3 Future directions
One of the future directions is investigating a tracker level game model.
In this game model, the tracker, in addition to its peer discovery role
is also involved in the management and coordination of the game and
its information. Involving the tracker in this game is to cater for global
objective or community welfare such as availability of resources and
fairness in sharing. But, a careful study of this model poses lots of
challenges to a BitTorrent system. Amongst such drawbacks are;
Increase in the degree of centralization, which may lead to a single
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point of failure. The management of the game model ceases as
soon as the tracker goes down.
Increase in the number of messages exchanged. This results from
the extra game information that needs to be updated by the
tracker.
Despite the aforementioned challenges that may face involving the
tracker in the game, the idea is worth exploring further. Implementing
a tracker based game model might lead to intelligent peer set assign-
ment and better resource utilization.
Another future direction is to extend our proposed game model to work
in a pure P2P environment. As it stands now, resource discovery is done
in a centralized manner while resource dissemination is done in a P2P
fashion. In a pure P2P environment, there is no centralization point
hence resource discovery needs to be done in a distributed manner.
Another issue is managing the status of peers. For example, when a
peer becomes a seeder, where should this change of status be kept.
That is managing the swarm as well as ensuring that the peer set is
randomly chosen from the swarm.
Furthermore, identity management can be examined to study the effect
of identity changes on our proposed model. A free rider can spawn
multiple identities in order to download from experienced seeders and
leechers because experienced seeders and leechers will unchoke new
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peers. Therefore, a free rider can exploit this point by having multiple
identities. Multiple identities can also help a free rider to contact the
tracker multiple times and therefore increases its peer set beyond the
standard peer set size. This allows the free rider to contact a large
number of experienced seeders and leechers and hence the free rider
will have access to more resource providers.
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